Closereads: Philosophy with Mark and Wes https://closereadsphilosophy.com en Mark Linsenmayer and Wes Alwan 2024 Reading through difficult philosophy texts line-by-line to try to figure out what’s really being said. https://megaphone.imgix.net/podcasts/7370ece4-d674-11ee-8417-f3a09f8e872d/image/671804eff7b2e1809d34e5451f636935.jpg?ixlib=rails-4.3.1&max-w=3000&max-h=3000&fit=crop&auto=format,compress Closereads: Philosophy with Mark and Wes https://closereadsphilosophy.com episodic A Partially Examined Life Podcast Evergreen Podcasts Reading through difficult philosophy texts line-by-line to try to figure out what’s really being said. Reading through difficult philosophy texts line-by-line to try to figure out what’s really being said.

]]> Mark Linsenmayer, Wes Alwan closereads@partiallyexaminedlife.com Lionel Trilling on Sincerity (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/157074020 On Ch. 2 "The Honest Soul and the Disintegrated Consciousness" in Sincerity and Authenticity (1972). This chapter focuses on a reading of Diderot's Rameau's Nephew and what Hegel made of it in the Phenomenology, so it's essentially for us a second opinion re. what we've been talking about on The Partially Examined Life. Read along with us. Watch this as unedited video. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Fri, 01 May 2026 13:48:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts On Ch. 2 "The Honest Soul and the Disintegrated Consciousness" in Sincerity and Authenticity (1972). This chapter focuses on a reading of Diderot's Rameau's Nephew and what Hegel made of it in the Phenomenology, so it's essentially for us a second opinion re. what we've been talking about on The Partially Examined Life. Read along with us. Watch this as unedited video. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices On Ch. 2 "The Honest Soul and the Disintegrated Consciousness" in Sincerity and Authenticity (1972). This chapter focuses on a reading of Diderot's Rameau's Nephew and what Hegel made of it in the Phenomenology, so it's essentially for us a second opinion re. what we've been talking about on The Partially Examined Life.

Read along with us.

Watch this as unedited video.

To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3578 Galen Strawson Against Narrativity (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/155174042 On "Against Narrativity" (2004), where Galen (son of P.F.) argues that the prevalent philosophical and cultural camp is wrong. This objectionable camp (the Narratives) says that we understand our lives by telling ourselves a story about ourselves. Moreover, this is how we make meaning out of our lives, and how we thus behave ethically, taking responsibility for our past and future: how we have integrity. Galen rejects both the descriptive claim here (that this is how we all, or at least those of us functioning as designed, process our experience) and the moral claim (that ethical comportment requires that we experience our lives narratively. Read along with us. You can choose to watch this on video. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 09 Apr 2026 17:08:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts On "Against Narrativity" (2004), where Galen (son of P.F.) argues that the prevalent philosophical and cultural camp is wrong. This objectionable camp (the Narratives) says that we understand our lives by telling ourselves a story about ourselves. Moreover, this is how we make meaning out of our lives, and how we thus behave ethically, taking responsibility for our past and future: how we have integrity. Galen rejects both the descriptive claim here (that this is how we all, or at least those of us functioning as designed, process our experience) and the moral claim (that ethical comportment requires that we experience our lives narratively. Read along with us. You can choose to watch this on video. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices On "Against Narrativity" (2004), where Galen (son of P.F.) argues that the prevalent philosophical and cultural camp is wrong. This objectionable camp (the Narratives) says that we understand our lives by telling ourselves a story about ourselves. Moreover, this is how we make meaning out of our lives, and how we thus behave ethically, taking responsibility for our past and future: how we have integrity.

Galen rejects both the descriptive claim here (that this is how we all, or at least those of us functioning as designed, process our experience) and the moral claim (that ethical comportment requires that we experience our lives narratively. Read along with us.

You can choose to watch this on video. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3649 Kierkegaard on Knowledge (Part Two) https://www.patreon.com/posts/152880435 Continuing on Concluding Unscientific Postscript, now beginning the section called "Subjective Truth, Inwardness; Truth Is Subjectivity." K. slowly unravels his thoughts on why objective thought as Hegel (or anyone else) conceives of it is inhuman: We are persons changing over time, trying to know a world that is changing over time, so knowledge claims must not avoid mention of the position of the knowing subject. Read along with us, starting at the bottom of p198 (PDF p3). To get future parts of this discussion, you'll need to support us at ⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 12 Mar 2026 19:00:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts Continuing on Concluding Unscientific Postscript, now beginning the section called "Subjective Truth, Inwardness; Truth Is Subjectivity." K. slowly unravels his thoughts on why objective thought as Hegel (or anyone else) conceives of it is inhuman: We are persons changing over time, trying to know a world that is changing over time, so knowledge claims must not avoid mention of the position of the knowing subject. Read along with us, starting at the bottom of p198 (PDF p3). To get future parts of this discussion, you'll need to support us at ⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Continuing on Concluding Unscientific Postscript, now beginning the section called "Subjective Truth, Inwardness; Truth Is Subjectivity."

K. slowly unravels his thoughts on why objective thought as Hegel (or anyone else) conceives of it is inhuman: We are persons changing over time, trying to know a world that is changing over time, so knowledge claims must not avoid mention of the position of the knowing subject.

Read along with us, starting at the bottom of p198 (PDF p3).

To get future parts of this discussion, you'll need to support us at ⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠⁠.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3312 Kierkegaard on Knowledge (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/152401881 On an excerpt from Soren Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846) that critiques Hegel's idea of logic (dialectic) and then argues for his own conception of "truth as subjectivity." In this first part, he's mostly focusing on Hegel. First (along with the rest of the world), K. denies Hegel's idea that logic is equivalent to physics (or biology, or any other analysis of what actually exists). Furthermore, the idea of a "system" is only one that (according to K) makes sense if you're looking down on the universe from God's perspective. Everything else is in progress: the object you're trying to know is changing, and you as subject are changing. Follow along, starting on PDF p. 2 (document p. 196). To get all parts of this discussion, you'll need to support us at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Fri, 06 Mar 2026 19:48:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts On an excerpt from Soren Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846) that critiques Hegel's idea of logic (dialectic) and then argues for his own conception of "truth as subjectivity." In this first part, he's mostly focusing on Hegel. First (along with the rest of the world), K. denies Hegel's idea that logic is equivalent to physics (or biology, or any other analysis of what actually exists). Furthermore, the idea of a "system" is only one that (according to K) makes sense if you're looking down on the universe from God's perspective. Everything else is in progress: the object you're trying to know is changing, and you as subject are changing. Follow along, starting on PDF p. 2 (document p. 196). To get all parts of this discussion, you'll need to support us at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices On an excerpt from Soren Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846) that critiques Hegel's idea of logic (dialectic) and then argues for his own conception of "truth as subjectivity."

In this first part, he's mostly focusing on Hegel. First (along with the rest of the world), K. denies Hegel's idea that logic is equivalent to physics (or biology, or any other analysis of what actually exists). Furthermore, the idea of a "system" is only one that (according to K) makes sense if you're looking down on the universe from God's perspective. Everything else is in progress: the object you're trying to know is changing, and you as subject are changing.

Follow along, starting on PDF p. 2 (document p. 196).

To get all parts of this discussion, you'll need to support us at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3573 Hegel's "Unhappy Consciousness" (Part Two) https://www.patreon.com/posts/149944574 We're up to sec. 208 in The Phenomenology of Spirit, still trying to figure out how and why individual consciousness is related to "The Unchangeable," which could be the Kantian thing-in-itself, or perhaps specifically the human soul as a thing-in-itself, or maybe Platonic Forms or God or some other Parmenidean One. Because this "part two" discussion was so enthralling, I'm sharing it on this feed, but to get parts 3 and 4, you'll need to sign up to support us: patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 05 Feb 2026 18:11:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts We're up to sec. 208 in The Phenomenology of Spirit, still trying to figure out how and why individual consciousness is related to "The Unchangeable," which could be the Kantian thing-in-itself, or perhaps specifically the human soul as a thing-in-itself, or maybe Platonic Forms or God or some other Parmenidean One. Because this "part two" discussion was so enthralling, I'm sharing it on this feed, but to get parts 3 and 4, you'll need to sign up to support us: patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices We're up to sec. 208 in The Phenomenology of Spirit, still trying to figure out how and why individual consciousness is related to "The Unchangeable," which could be the Kantian thing-in-itself, or perhaps specifically the human soul as a thing-in-itself, or maybe Platonic Forms or God or some other Parmenidean One.

Because this "part two" discussion was so enthralling, I'm sharing it on this feed, but to get parts 3 and 4, you'll need to sign up to support us: patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3839 Hegel's "Unhappy Consciousness" (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/149539990 We're within the Self-Consciousness chapter of The Phenomenology of Spirit, specifically starting at sec. 206, which is the transition between two sections we've already considered on this podcast: Stoicism (and Skepticism) and Reason. The more famous part of the self-consciousness portion of the book is on the Master-Slave conflict, and in this section, we've got a similar dividedness, but it's all within one psyche, like you're being tortured by a voice in your head that you don't realize is just part of you. We go between three different translations here: Pinkard, Inwood, and finally Miller, which is what we normally use and will use going forward. You can choose to watch this on unedited video. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠⁠⁠⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠⁠⁠⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Sat, 31 Jan 2026 15:27:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts We're within the Self-Consciousness chapter of The Phenomenology of Spirit, specifically starting at sec. 206, which is the transition between two sections we've already considered on this podcast: Stoicism (and Skepticism) and Reason. The more famous part of the self-consciousness portion of the book is on the Master-Slave conflict, and in this section, we've got a similar dividedness, but it's all within one psyche, like you're being tortured by a voice in your head that you don't realize is just part of you. We go between three different translations here: Pinkard, Inwood, and finally Miller, which is what we normally use and will use going forward. You can choose to watch this on unedited video. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠⁠⁠⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠⁠⁠⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices We're within the Self-Consciousness chapter of The Phenomenology of Spirit, specifically starting at sec. 206, which is the transition between two sections we've already considered on this podcast: Stoicism (and Skepticism) and Reason. The more famous part of the self-consciousness portion of the book is on the Master-Slave conflict, and in this section, we've got a similar dividedness, but it's all within one psyche, like you're being tortured by a voice in your head that you don't realize is just part of you.

We go between three different translations here: Pinkard, Inwood, and finally Miller, which is what we normally use and will use going forward.

You can choose to watch this on unedited video. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠⁠⁠⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠⁠⁠⁠.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3331 Latour on Materialism https://www.patreon.com/posts/148706589 Mark and Wes read and discuss the short 2007 article, "Can We Get Our Materialism Back, Please?" Here Bruno Latour complains that materialism as modern common sense conceives of it is actually idealist: It is a social construction. Instead, a "thick" concept of material things acknowledges and details their historical (i.e. material in the Marxist sense) origins. Read along with us. You can choose to watch this on video. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Tue, 20 Jan 2026 19:42:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts Mark and Wes read and discuss the short 2007 article, "Can We Get Our Materialism Back, Please?" Here Bruno Latour complains that materialism as modern common sense conceives of it is actually idealist: It is a social construction. Instead, a "thick" concept of material things acknowledges and details their historical (i.e. material in the Marxist sense) origins. Read along with us. You can choose to watch this on video. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Mark and Wes read and discuss the short 2007 article, "Can We Get Our Materialism Back, Please?" Here Bruno Latour complains that materialism as modern common sense conceives of it is actually idealist: It is a social construction. Instead, a "thick" concept of material things acknowledges and details their historical (i.e. material in the Marxist sense) origins.

Read along with us.

You can choose to watch this on video.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3905 Fanon on Hegel https://www.patreon.com/posts/147902763 On Franz Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks, ch. 7, B. "The Negro and Hegel." Hegel describes the abstract attainment of self-consciousness through recognition, but is this actually how it works in real slavery and its aftermath? Read along with us, p. 216 (PDF p. 234). You can choose to ⁠watch this on video⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Sat, 10 Jan 2026 18:57:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts On Franz Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks, ch. 7, B. "The Negro and Hegel." Hegel describes the abstract attainment of self-consciousness through recognition, but is this actually how it works in real slavery and its aftermath? Read along with us, p. 216 (PDF p. 234). You can choose to ⁠watch this on video⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices On Franz Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks, ch. 7, B. "The Negro and Hegel." Hegel describes the abstract attainment of self-consciousness through recognition, but is this actually how it works in real slavery and its aftermath?

Read along with us, p. 216 (PDF p. 234).

You can choose to ⁠watch this on video⁠.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3841 Aquinas and Scotus on Law (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/146151998 While we modern folks have a generally clear distinction between law as in descriptive laws of nature and law as in ethical or civil commandments, these Medieval philosophers saw these as very much related if not actually the same thing, given that humans can ignore the dictates of their nature, i.e. reason, whereas the rest of nature just proceeds according to natural law, which for these theologians means God's dictates. So what actually is the relation, in general, between law and reason? Our text includes Aquinas' presentation of this issue and his near-contemporary Duns Scotus' commentary on it. Read along with us. You can choose to watch this on video. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠⁠⁠⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠⁠⁠⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 18 Dec 2025 16:15:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts While we modern folks have a generally clear distinction between law as in descriptive laws of nature and law as in ethical or civil commandments, these Medieval philosophers saw these as very much related if not actually the same thing, given that humans can ignore the dictates of their nature, i.e. reason, whereas the rest of nature just proceeds according to natural law, which for these theologians means God's dictates. So what actually is the relation, in general, between law and reason? Our text includes Aquinas' presentation of this issue and his near-contemporary Duns Scotus' commentary on it. Read along with us. You can choose to watch this on video. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠⁠⁠⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠⁠⁠⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices While we modern folks have a generally clear distinction between law as in descriptive laws of nature and law as in ethical or civil commandments, these Medieval philosophers saw these as very much related if not actually the same thing, given that humans can ignore the dictates of their nature, i.e. reason, whereas the rest of nature just proceeds according to natural law, which for these theologians means God's dictates. So what actually is the relation, in general, between law and reason?

Our text includes Aquinas' presentation of this issue and his near-contemporary Duns Scotus' commentary on it. Read along with us.

You can choose to watch this on video. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠⁠⁠⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠⁠⁠⁠.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3443 Josiah Royce on Interpreting Other People https://www.patreon.com/posts/145708375 On "The Problem of Christianity," vol. 2, lecture 12, ch. 9, "The Will to Interpret." The point is to help explain Royce's idea of a community of interpretation, and the idea is that in the very act of interpreting a single individual, I'm bringing in some kind of public lexicon, i.e. other people beyond us two. Even though other people are fundamentally separate from us, we make some sort of leap that is the foundation of community: the will to interpret you as if your mind were accessible to mine. Read along with us. You can choose to watch this on video. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Fri, 12 Dec 2025 19:25:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts On "The Problem of Christianity," vol. 2, lecture 12, ch. 9, "The Will to Interpret." The point is to help explain Royce's idea of a community of interpretation, and the idea is that in the very act of interpreting a single individual, I'm bringing in some kind of public lexicon, i.e. other people beyond us two. Even though other people are fundamentally separate from us, we make some sort of leap that is the foundation of community: the will to interpret you as if your mind were accessible to mine. Read along with us. You can choose to watch this on video. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices On "The Problem of Christianity," vol. 2, lecture 12, ch. 9, "The Will to Interpret."

The point is to help explain Royce's idea of a community of interpretation, and the idea is that in the very act of interpreting a single individual, I'm bringing in some kind of public lexicon, i.e. other people beyond us two. Even though other people are fundamentally separate from us, we make some sort of leap that is the foundation of community: the will to interpret you as if your mind were accessible to mine.

Read along with us.

You can choose to watch this on video.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 4113 Hegel on Reason (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/143579428 On Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Part C (AA) Reason, V. The Certainty and Truth of Reason. This section comes right after the self-consciousness sections, and so its big puzzle is why? Why is full recognition by another self-consciousness necessary for Reason, and consequently what is Hegel's conception of Reason? Read along with us, on PDF p. 175, i.e. section 231. You can choose to watch this on YouTube. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠⁠⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠⁠⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Fri, 14 Nov 2025 15:46:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts On Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Part C (AA) Reason, V. The Certainty and Truth of Reason. This section comes right after the self-consciousness sections, and so its big puzzle is why? Why is full recognition by another self-consciousness necessary for Reason, and consequently what is Hegel's conception of Reason? Read along with us, on PDF p. 175, i.e. section 231. You can choose to watch this on YouTube. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠⁠⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠⁠⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices On Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Part C (AA) Reason, V. The Certainty and Truth of Reason. This section comes right after the self-consciousness sections, and so its big puzzle is why? Why is full recognition by another self-consciousness necessary for Reason, and consequently what is Hegel's conception of Reason?

Read along with us, on PDF p. 175, i.e. section 231.

You can choose to watch this on YouTube.

To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠⁠⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠⁠⁠.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3482 Dispute Between a Man and His Ba https://www.patreon.com/posts/dispute-between-142994537 In this famous, impossibly ancient (ca. 1900 BC!) Egyptian text, a man negotiations with the part of his soul that's supposed to help him in the afterlife. Can he kill himself now and still get all the benefits of an honorable death? His ba says no. Is this actually philosophy, or just a glimpse into the strangeness of a long-gone culture? You decide! Read along with us. You can choose to watch this on video. Get this ad-free along with every Closereads recording at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 06 Nov 2025 19:25:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts In this famous, impossibly ancient (ca. 1900 BC!) Egyptian text, a man negotiations with the part of his soul that's supposed to help him in the afterlife. Can he kill himself now and still get all the benefits of an honorable death? His ba says no. Is this actually philosophy, or just a glimpse into the strangeness of a long-gone culture? You decide! Read along with us. You can choose to watch this on video. Get this ad-free along with every Closereads recording at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices In this famous, impossibly ancient (ca. 1900 BC!) Egyptian text, a man negotiations with the part of his soul that's supposed to help him in the afterlife. Can he kill himself now and still get all the benefits of an honorable death? His ba says no. Is this actually philosophy, or just a glimpse into the strangeness of a long-gone culture? You decide!

Read along with us.

You can choose to watch this on video.

Get this ad-free along with every Closereads recording at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3438 Aquinas and Aristotle on Soul https://www.patreon.com/posts/142428164 From Disputed Questions in De Anima (1269) as presented in Thomas Aquinas: Selected Philosophical Writings (Oxford 1993), "Passage 18: Soul in Human Beings." The question is how Aquinas, as an Aristotelian who therefore thinks the mind is the form of the body, can agree with the Christian doctrine that the soul exists after death. The answer is surprisingly weird: The body-less soul is incomplete, so we'd need to have the end-of-times full-bodily-resurrection of all the good people in order to have a truly satisfactory heaven. Read along with us. The Aristotle chapter from "De Anima" (Part III, Ch. 5) is here, PDF p. 41. You can choose to watch this on video. Get this ad-free along with every Closereads recording at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 30 Oct 2025 17:00:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts From Disputed Questions in De Anima (1269) as presented in Thomas Aquinas: Selected Philosophical Writings (Oxford 1993), "Passage 18: Soul in Human Beings." The question is how Aquinas, as an Aristotelian who therefore thinks the mind is the form of the body, can agree with the Christian doctrine that the soul exists after death. The answer is surprisingly weird: The body-less soul is incomplete, so we'd need to have the end-of-times full-bodily-resurrection of all the good people in order to have a truly satisfactory heaven. Read along with us. The Aristotle chapter from "De Anima" (Part III, Ch. 5) is here, PDF p. 41. You can choose to watch this on video. Get this ad-free along with every Closereads recording at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices From Disputed Questions in De Anima (1269) as presented in Thomas Aquinas: Selected Philosophical Writings (Oxford 1993), "Passage 18: Soul in Human Beings."

The question is how Aquinas, as an Aristotelian who therefore thinks the mind is the form of the body, can agree with the Christian doctrine that the soul exists after death. The answer is surprisingly weird: The body-less soul is incomplete, so we'd need to have the end-of-times full-bodily-resurrection of all the good people in order to have a truly satisfactory heaven.

Read along with us. The Aristotle chapter from "De Anima" (Part III, Ch. 5) is here, PDF p. 41.

You can choose to watch this on video.

Get this ad-free along with every Closereads recording at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3907 Hobbes on Liberty https://www.patreon.com/posts/hobbes-on-audio-141375328 On Leviathan (1651), ch. 21, "On the Liberty of Subjects." Thomas Hobbes is known for defending absolute monarchy, so as you'd predict, he's not going to say we have a lot of "natural" liberties. We do always have the right to self-defense, but that doesn't mean that the sovereign can't with complete justice command you executed (even if you're innocent). Yet Hobbes wants to say that even under a repressive regime we all have lots of liberty, in the sense of no one physically stopping us from doing what we will. And he wants to dismiss as unintelligible any other sense of liberty tied to non-physical obstacles, so this entirely rules out any debate about free will. Read along with us, starting on p. 161 (PDF p. 197). You can choose to watch this on video. Get the ad-free version of this and all of our episodes, including many supporter-exclusive ones, at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 16 Oct 2025 17:01:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts On Leviathan (1651), ch. 21, "On the Liberty of Subjects." Thomas Hobbes is known for defending absolute monarchy, so as you'd predict, he's not going to say we have a lot of "natural" liberties. We do always have the right to self-defense, but that doesn't mean that the sovereign can't with complete justice command you executed (even if you're innocent). Yet Hobbes wants to say that even under a repressive regime we all have lots of liberty, in the sense of no one physically stopping us from doing what we will. And he wants to dismiss as unintelligible any other sense of liberty tied to non-physical obstacles, so this entirely rules out any debate about free will. Read along with us, starting on p. 161 (PDF p. 197). You can choose to watch this on video. Get the ad-free version of this and all of our episodes, including many supporter-exclusive ones, at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices On Leviathan (1651), ch. 21, "On the Liberty of Subjects." Thomas Hobbes is known for defending absolute monarchy, so as you'd predict, he's not going to say we have a lot of "natural" liberties.

We do always have the right to self-defense, but that doesn't mean that the sovereign can't with complete justice command you executed (even if you're innocent). Yet Hobbes wants to say that even under a repressive regime we all have lots of liberty, in the sense of no one physically stopping us from doing what we will. And he wants to dismiss as unintelligible any other sense of liberty tied to non-physical obstacles, so this entirely rules out any debate about free will.

Read along with us, starting on p. 161 (PDF p. 197).

You can choose to watch this on video.

Get the ad-free version of this and all of our episodes, including many supporter-exclusive ones, at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3739 Aristotle on Final Causes https://www.patreon.com/posts/aristotle-on-140846564 On Aristotle's Physics, book 2, ch. 8 on "final causation," i.e. purposiveness as a natural explanation. Modern science doesn't much like this kind of explanation, but Aristotle found it essential, and here's his argument for it. Read along with us. You can choose to watch this on video. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 09 Oct 2025 21:22:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts On Aristotle's Physics, book 2, ch. 8 on "final causation," i.e. purposiveness as a natural explanation. Modern science doesn't much like this kind of explanation, but Aristotle found it essential, and here's his argument for it. Read along with us. You can choose to watch this on video. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices On Aristotle's Physics, book 2, ch. 8 on "final causation," i.e. purposiveness as a natural explanation. Modern science doesn't much like this kind of explanation, but Aristotle found it essential, and here's his argument for it.

Read along with us.

You can choose to watch this on video.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 4165 Horkheimer and Adorno on Enlightenment (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/139191702 On "The Concept of Enlightenment" (1944), the first essay in this Frankfurt School book of critical theory, The Dialectic of Enlightenment. Our authors lay out what they take The Enlightenment to consist of, including some quotes from Francis Bacon, and some ultimately fatal tensions within it that make it no longer serve the humanistic purposes it was created for. Read along with us on PDF p. 22. You can choose to watch this on video. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠⁠⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠⁠⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 18 Sep 2025 15:31:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts On "The Concept of Enlightenment" (1944), the first essay in this Frankfurt School book of critical theory, The Dialectic of Enlightenment. Our authors lay out what they take The Enlightenment to consist of, including some quotes from Francis Bacon, and some ultimately fatal tensions within it that make it no longer serve the humanistic purposes it was created for. Read along with us on PDF p. 22. You can choose to watch this on video. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠⁠⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠⁠⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices On "The Concept of Enlightenment" (1944), the first essay in this Frankfurt School book of critical theory, The Dialectic of Enlightenment.

Our authors lay out what they take The Enlightenment to consist of, including some quotes from Francis Bacon, and some ultimately fatal tensions within it that make it no longer serve the humanistic purposes it was created for.

Read along with us on PDF p. 22.

You can choose to watch this on video.

To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠⁠⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠⁠⁠.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3833 Hegel on Stoicism (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/hegel-on-audio-138064336 Discussing the section on Stoicism in Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit," which is under "Freedom of Self-Consciousness," "Stoicism, Scepticism, and the Unhappy Consciousness." This comes right after his famous lordship and bondage chapter, and explains how in reaction to being defined by the gaze of another person, we assert our independence, but in an immature and ultimately unsustainable way. So this is not a very charitable take on Stoicism; he's just focusing on this assertion of freedom that's at the heart of the philosophy, and you can think yourself about the degree to which this pollutes more thoughtful, developed versions. Follow along with us. You can choose to watch this on video. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Mon, 08 Sep 2025 13:59:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts Discussing the section on Stoicism in Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit," which is under "Freedom of Self-Consciousness," "Stoicism, Scepticism, and the Unhappy Consciousness." This comes right after his famous lordship and bondage chapter, and explains how in reaction to being defined by the gaze of another person, we assert our independence, but in an immature and ultimately unsustainable way. So this is not a very charitable take on Stoicism; he's just focusing on this assertion of freedom that's at the heart of the philosophy, and you can think yourself about the degree to which this pollutes more thoughtful, developed versions. Follow along with us. You can choose to watch this on video. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Discussing the section on Stoicism in Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit," which is under "Freedom of Self-Consciousness," "Stoicism, Scepticism, and the Unhappy Consciousness."

This comes right after his famous lordship and bondage chapter, and explains how in reaction to being defined by the gaze of another person, we assert our independence, but in an immature and ultimately unsustainable way. So this is not a very charitable take on Stoicism; he's just focusing on this assertion of freedom that's at the heart of the philosophy, and you can think yourself about the degree to which this pollutes more thoughtful, developed versions.

Follow along with us.

You can choose to watch this on video.

To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠⁠.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3493 Peter Railton's "Moral Realism" (Wrap Up) https://www.patreon.com/posts/peter-railtons-136859536 Concluding our treatment of Peter Railton's "Moral Realism" (1984). This is our eighth discussion of this reading, but don't worry if you haven't listened to the paywalled parts. This discussion can serve as a standalone summary of not only Railton's view, but of our efforts to actually figure out what a plausible naturalistic, empirical account of ethics could amount to. Read along with us, starting on PDF p. 42. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Fri, 22 Aug 2025 17:15:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts Concluding our treatment of Peter Railton's "Moral Realism" (1984). This is our eighth discussion of this reading, but don't worry if you haven't listened to the paywalled parts. This discussion can serve as a standalone summary of not only Railton's view, but of our efforts to actually figure out what a plausible naturalistic, empirical account of ethics could amount to. Read along with us, starting on PDF p. 42. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Concluding our treatment of Peter Railton's "Moral Realism" (1984).

This is our eighth discussion of this reading, but don't worry if you haven't listened to the paywalled parts. This discussion can serve as a standalone summary of not only Railton's view, but of our efforts to actually figure out what a plausible naturalistic, empirical account of ethics could amount to.

Read along with us, starting on PDF p. 42.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3413 Peter Railton's "Moral Realism" (Part Four) https://www.patreon.com/posts/134710273 What? Part Four? Yes, we're jumping back into a 1984 paper that we began a couple of years ago in light of our recent PEL activity on contemporary ethics. You should be fine just starting here, but all three previous parts have been made public on our Patreon page, which is where you'll eventually find parts 5, 6, and possibly more. So far, Railton has been giving us an account of our objective individual interests: What you would want for your current you if you had all the relevant knowledge. He had given an example of a dehydrated person who wants and enjoys milk, even though milk does not help with dehydration in the way that water does. If he had the relevant knowledge, he would water. More precisely, he would want his current self in the state of dehydration to want water, because who knows what such an all-knowing person would even be like or what his wants for himself would be? We're still picking at the complexities of this as we resume progress in this essay; it's not until the end of this hour that we can even predict where he's going in terms of setting up actual morality, beyond mere objective self-interest. Read along with us, starting on PDF p. 15. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Tue, 22 Jul 2025 17:33:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts What? Part Four? Yes, we're jumping back into a 1984 paper that we began a couple of years ago in light of our recent PEL activity on contemporary ethics. You should be fine just starting here, but all three previous parts have been made public on our Patreon page, which is where you'll eventually find parts 5, 6, and possibly more. So far, Railton has been giving us an account of our objective individual interests: What you would want for your current you if you had all the relevant knowledge. He had given an example of a dehydrated person who wants and enjoys milk, even though milk does not help with dehydration in the way that water does. If he had the relevant knowledge, he would water. More precisely, he would want his current self in the state of dehydration to want water, because who knows what such an all-knowing person would even be like or what his wants for himself would be? We're still picking at the complexities of this as we resume progress in this essay; it's not until the end of this hour that we can even predict where he's going in terms of setting up actual morality, beyond mere objective self-interest. Read along with us, starting on PDF p. 15. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices What? Part Four? Yes, we're jumping back into a 1984 paper that we began a couple of years ago in light of our recent PEL activity on contemporary ethics. You should be fine just starting here, but all three previous parts have been made public on our Patreon page, which is where you'll eventually find parts 5, 6, and possibly more.

So far, Railton has been giving us an account of our objective individual interests: What you would want for your current you if you had all the relevant knowledge. He had given an example of a dehydrated person who wants and enjoys milk, even though milk does not help with dehydration in the way that water does. If he had the relevant knowledge, he would water. More precisely, he would want his current self in the state of dehydration to want water, because who knows what such an all-knowing person would even be like or what his wants for himself would be?

We're still picking at the complexities of this as we resume progress in this essay; it's not until the end of this hour that we can even predict where he's going in terms of setting up actual morality, beyond mere objective self-interest.

Read along with us, starting on PDF p. 15.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3720 H.A. Prichard on Ethics (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/133102391 On "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" (1912). Prichard claims that we feel certain actions to be obligatory, and that we have no justification for doubting those raw intuitions. The situation, he claims, is comparable to epistemology: We have no grounds for doubting globally a la Descartes, but only in particular circumstances where science demands we should go back and check again, but more carefully. Likewise, we can be wrong about particular moral judgments, but the process of refining them is just to put ourselves (really or imaginatively) in the ethical situation and gauge the intuitions more carefully. So the only legitimate task of moral philosophy is to establish that global doubt is not warranted, and to get us to observe our intuitions more carefully and discuss them with others. Read along with us. You can choose to watch this on video⁠. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Wed, 02 Jul 2025 13:13:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts On "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" (1912). Prichard claims that we feel certain actions to be obligatory, and that we have no justification for doubting those raw intuitions. The situation, he claims, is comparable to epistemology: We have no grounds for doubting globally a la Descartes, but only in particular circumstances where science demands we should go back and check again, but more carefully. Likewise, we can be wrong about particular moral judgments, but the process of refining them is just to put ourselves (really or imaginatively) in the ethical situation and gauge the intuitions more carefully. So the only legitimate task of moral philosophy is to establish that global doubt is not warranted, and to get us to observe our intuitions more carefully and discuss them with others. Read along with us. You can choose to watch this on video⁠. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices On "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" (1912). Prichard claims that we feel certain actions to be obligatory, and that we have no justification for doubting those raw intuitions. The situation, he claims, is comparable to epistemology: We have no grounds for doubting globally a la Descartes, but only in particular circumstances where science demands we should go back and check again, but more carefully.

Likewise, we can be wrong about particular moral judgments, but the process of refining them is just to put ourselves (really or imaginatively) in the ethical situation and gauge the intuitions more carefully. So the only legitimate task of moral philosophy is to establish that global doubt is not warranted, and to get us to observe our intuitions more carefully and discuss them with others.

Read along with us.

You can choose to watch this on video⁠. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3503 Parfit on Game Theory (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/131838306 On Derek Parfit's "Prudence, Morality, and the Prisoner's Dilemma" (1978). What is a "prisoner's dilemma" and what is its relevance to ethics? In general, it's better for me if I break norms so long as others in general follow them, but if we all try to be free riders in this way, then no one gets to ride at all. Parfit considers variations of this situation and lays out legislative and ideological/psychological strategies for addressing them. Read along with us. You can choose to watch this on video. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 19 Jun 2025 18:08:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts On Derek Parfit's "Prudence, Morality, and the Prisoner's Dilemma" (1978). What is a "prisoner's dilemma" and what is its relevance to ethics? In general, it's better for me if I break norms so long as others in general follow them, but if we all try to be free riders in this way, then no one gets to ride at all. Parfit considers variations of this situation and lays out legislative and ideological/psychological strategies for addressing them. Read along with us. You can choose to watch this on video. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices On Derek Parfit's "Prudence, Morality, and the Prisoner's Dilemma" (1978). What is a "prisoner's dilemma" and what is its relevance to ethics? In general, it's better for me if I break norms so long as others in general follow them, but if we all try to be free riders in this way, then no one gets to ride at all. Parfit considers variations of this situation and lays out legislative and ideological/psychological strategies for addressing them.

Read along with us.

You can choose to watch this on video.

To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3623 Spinoza on Emotions (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/130773752 On Spinoza's Ethics, Third Part, "Concerning the Origin and Nature of the Emotions." We want to see how emotions ground ethics, but first, we have to explain what emotions are, which means explaining how mind and body (and causality) work together on Spinoza's account. A passion is being affected by something that we don't understand, whereas reason (which will yield ethical behavior) involves grasping a cause clearly and distinctly. The latter means it's in your individual mind, whereas even if you don't understand the cause, it's still in God's mind, which each of us is essentially a part of. Read along with us, starting on p. 83 (PDF p. 129). You can choose to watch this on video. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 05 Jun 2025 13:46:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts On Spinoza's Ethics, Third Part, "Concerning the Origin and Nature of the Emotions." We want to see how emotions ground ethics, but first, we have to explain what emotions are, which means explaining how mind and body (and causality) work together on Spinoza's account. A passion is being affected by something that we don't understand, whereas reason (which will yield ethical behavior) involves grasping a cause clearly and distinctly. The latter means it's in your individual mind, whereas even if you don't understand the cause, it's still in God's mind, which each of us is essentially a part of. Read along with us, starting on p. 83 (PDF p. 129). You can choose to watch this on video. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices On Spinoza's Ethics, Third Part, "Concerning the Origin and Nature of the Emotions."

We want to see how emotions ground ethics, but first, we have to explain what emotions are, which means explaining how mind and body (and causality) work together on Spinoza's account. A passion is being affected by something that we don't understand, whereas reason (which will yield ethical behavior) involves grasping a cause clearly and distinctly. The latter means it's in your individual mind, whereas even if you don't understand the cause, it's still in God's mind, which each of us is essentially a part of.

Read along with us, starting on p. 83 (PDF p. 129).

You can choose to watch this on video.

To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3454 Scheler on Personhood (Part Three) https://www.patreon.com/posts/130200289 On "Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values" (1916), Ch. 6 "Formalism and Person," sec. 3, "Person and Act." While you may want to listen to part one, we're more or less starting fresh, as parts one and two (the latter only available to paying supporters at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy), were mostly about how Scheler rejects Kant's idea of the transcendental ego. We're skipping several pages here to start with section 3 on the recommendation from a member of the International Scheler society, hoping that at least we will find out what makes a person: What makes each of us unique and worthy of moral respect? Read along with us, starting on p. 382 (PDF p. 415). You can choose to watch this on video. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 29 May 2025 18:39:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts On "Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values" (1916), Ch. 6 "Formalism and Person," sec. 3, "Person and Act." While you may want to listen to part one, we're more or less starting fresh, as parts one and two (the latter only available to paying supporters at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy), were mostly about how Scheler rejects Kant's idea of the transcendental ego. We're skipping several pages here to start with section 3 on the recommendation from a member of the International Scheler society, hoping that at least we will find out what makes a person: What makes each of us unique and worthy of moral respect? Read along with us, starting on p. 382 (PDF p. 415). You can choose to watch this on video. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices On "Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values" (1916), Ch. 6 "Formalism and Person," sec. 3, "Person and Act."

While you may want to listen to part one, we're more or less starting fresh, as parts one and two (the latter only available to paying supporters at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy), were mostly about how Scheler rejects Kant's idea of the transcendental ego. We're skipping several pages here to start with section 3 on the recommendation from a member of the International Scheler society, hoping that at least we will find out what makes a person: What makes each of us unique and worthy of moral respect?

Read along with us, starting on p. 382 (PDF p. 415).

You can choose to watch this on video.


Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 4039 Edith Stein on Self (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/128119203 We discuss "On the Problem of Empathy," ch. 4 "Empathy as the Comprehension of Mental Persons," starting with section 2, "The Mental Subject" and into section 3, "The Constitution of the Person in Emotional Experiences." We're trying to figure out what these early 20th century German phenomenologists think a "person" is as someone we're able to empathize or sympathize with and which is morally worthy of respect. Stein does this by saying what the "I" (the self) is. It is the thing that "has" experiences, but also something that we understand in terms of a network of motivations, which are different than mere causes, in that they're supposed to be rational. Our self gains definition, Stein says, when we have emotional experiences, which can of course be shallow and undirected (mere moods) or can be very deep and self-revelatory. Read along with us, starting on p. 87 (PDF p. 107). You can choose to ⁠watch this on video⁠. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Mon, 05 May 2025 20:43:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts We discuss "On the Problem of Empathy," ch. 4 "Empathy as the Comprehension of Mental Persons," starting with section 2, "The Mental Subject" and into section 3, "The Constitution of the Person in Emotional Experiences." We're trying to figure out what these early 20th century German phenomenologists think a "person" is as someone we're able to empathize or sympathize with and which is morally worthy of respect. Stein does this by saying what the "I" (the self) is. It is the thing that "has" experiences, but also something that we understand in terms of a network of motivations, which are different than mere causes, in that they're supposed to be rational. Our self gains definition, Stein says, when we have emotional experiences, which can of course be shallow and undirected (mere moods) or can be very deep and self-revelatory. Read along with us, starting on p. 87 (PDF p. 107). You can choose to ⁠watch this on video⁠. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices We discuss "On the Problem of Empathy," ch. 4 "Empathy as the Comprehension of Mental Persons," starting with section 2, "The Mental Subject" and into section 3, "The Constitution of the Person in Emotional Experiences."

We're trying to figure out what these early 20th century German phenomenologists think a "person" is as someone we're able to empathize or sympathize with and which is morally worthy of respect. Stein does this by saying what the "I" (the self) is. It is the thing that "has" experiences, but also something that we understand in terms of a network of motivations, which are different than mere causes, in that they're supposed to be rational. Our self gains definition, Stein says, when we have emotional experiences, which can of course be shallow and undirected (mere moods) or can be very deep and self-revelatory.

Read along with us, starting on p. 87 (PDF p. 107).

You can choose to ⁠watch this on video⁠.


To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠.


Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3703 Scheler on Personhood (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/126787916 On Ch. 6 "Formalism and Person," in Max Scheler's most famous work, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values (1916). Ethical Formalism is Kant: What makes something ethically correct is just something about the type of act and willing involved. Non-formalism pays attention to the content, e.g. our sentiments (a la Hume). As we've been studying on The Partially Examined Life, phenomenologists starting with Brentano sought to merge the two: Things in our experience just present themselves as intuitively praiseworthy, and this is sufficient to establish ethical obligations. We have been reading about how Scheler relies in his ethical theorizing on our experiences of sympathy and love, but we wanted to learn more about what it is about particular people that we love and respect: What is it to be a "person" in the moral sense? This book moves very slowly, so in this part he's still just distinguishing himself from Kant when it comes to saying some basic things about your relation to your own selfhood. Read along with us, starting on p. 370 (PDF p. 403). You can choose to watch this on video. To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Wed, 16 Apr 2025 20:55:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts On Ch. 6 "Formalism and Person," in Max Scheler's most famous work, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values (1916). Ethical Formalism is Kant: What makes something ethically correct is just something about the type of act and willing involved. Non-formalism pays attention to the content, e.g. our sentiments (a la Hume). As we've been studying on The Partially Examined Life, phenomenologists starting with Brentano sought to merge the two: Things in our experience just present themselves as intuitively praiseworthy, and this is sufficient to establish ethical obligations. We have been reading about how Scheler relies in his ethical theorizing on our experiences of sympathy and love, but we wanted to learn more about what it is about particular people that we love and respect: What is it to be a "person" in the moral sense? This book moves very slowly, so in this part he's still just distinguishing himself from Kant when it comes to saying some basic things about your relation to your own selfhood. Read along with us, starting on p. 370 (PDF p. 403). You can choose to watch this on video. To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices On Ch. 6 "Formalism and Person," in Max Scheler's most famous work, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values (1916). Ethical Formalism is Kant: What makes something ethically correct is just something about the type of act and willing involved. Non-formalism pays attention to the content, e.g. our sentiments (a la Hume).


As we've been studying on The Partially Examined Life, phenomenologists starting with Brentano sought to merge the two: Things in our experience just present themselves as intuitively praiseworthy, and this is sufficient to establish ethical obligations. We have been reading about how Scheler relies in his ethical theorizing on our experiences of sympathy and love, but we wanted to learn more about what it is about particular people that we love and respect: What is it to be a "person" in the moral sense?


This book moves very slowly, so in this part he's still just distinguishing himself from Kant when it comes to saying some basic things about your relation to your own selfhood.


Read along with us, starting on p. 370 (PDF p. 403).


You can choose to watch this on video.


To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3562 Schopenhauer on Ethics (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/schopenhauer-on-125679842 On The Basis of Morality (1840), Part III: "The Founding of Ethics," Ch. 5: "Statement and Proof of the Only True Moral Incentive." Everything up to this point in the book has been negative: Morality can't be founded on pure reason as Kant thinks, or on the idea of the good life (eudaimonia) per Aristotle. Schopenhauer tells us that all actions are motivated by someone's "weal" or "woe." We are naturally self-interested (motivated by own own weal and woe), but such actions will not be moral. So Schopenhauer's puzzle is: How can I be effectively motivated by someone else's weal and woe? I must somehow identify with that person so that the Other's suffering induces my compassion. This is the only source of moral value. Read along with us, starting on p. 165 (PDF p. 193). You can choose to watch this on video. To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Wed, 02 Apr 2025 19:56:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts On The Basis of Morality (1840), Part III: "The Founding of Ethics," Ch. 5: "Statement and Proof of the Only True Moral Incentive." Everything up to this point in the book has been negative: Morality can't be founded on pure reason as Kant thinks, or on the idea of the good life (eudaimonia) per Aristotle. Schopenhauer tells us that all actions are motivated by someone's "weal" or "woe." We are naturally self-interested (motivated by own own weal and woe), but such actions will not be moral. So Schopenhauer's puzzle is: How can I be effectively motivated by someone else's weal and woe? I must somehow identify with that person so that the Other's suffering induces my compassion. This is the only source of moral value. Read along with us, starting on p. 165 (PDF p. 193). You can choose to watch this on video. To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices On The Basis of Morality (1840), Part III: "The Founding of Ethics," Ch. 5: "Statement and Proof of the Only True Moral Incentive."


Everything up to this point in the book has been negative: Morality can't be founded on pure reason as Kant thinks, or on the idea of the good life (eudaimonia) per Aristotle. Schopenhauer tells us that all actions are motivated by someone's "weal" or "woe." We are naturally self-interested (motivated by own own weal and woe), but such actions will not be moral. So Schopenhauer's puzzle is: How can I be effectively motivated by someone else's weal and woe? I must somehow identify with that person so that the Other's suffering induces my compassion. This is the only source of moral value.


Read along with us, starting on p. 165 (PDF p. 193).


You can choose to watch this on video.


To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3894 Husserl on Perceiving Minds On Edmund Husserl’s Ideas, Vol. 2 (1928), Section 3, “The Constitution of the Spiritual World,” Ch. 1, “Opposition Between the Naturalistic and Personalistic Worlds." Given Husserl’s method of “reduction” whereby he sets aside the metaphysical status of objects in the natural world (are they mind-independent or merely ideas?), we wanted to see how he accounts for our ability to directly perceive other people’s minds. We don’t just perceive their bodies and our own bodies and deduce that others must be like us, but we perceive both our minds and those of others as strata (aspects) of physical bodies. Read along with us, starting on p. 183 (PDF p. 101). You can choose to watch this unedited on video. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Mon, 24 Mar 2025 14:11:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts On Edmund Husserl’s Ideas, Vol. 2 (1928), Section 3, “The Constitution of the Spiritual World,” Ch. 1, “Opposition Between the Naturalistic and Personalistic Worlds." Given Husserl’s method of “reduction” whereby he sets aside the metaphysical status of objects in the natural world (are they mind-independent or merely ideas?), we wanted to see how he accounts for our ability to directly perceive other people’s minds. We don’t just perceive their bodies and our own bodies and deduce that others must be like us, but we perceive both our minds and those of others as strata (aspects) of physical bodies. Read along with us, starting on p. 183 (PDF p. 101). You can choose to watch this unedited on video. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices On Edmund Husserl’s Ideas, Vol. 2 (1928), Section 3, “The Constitution of the Spiritual World,” Ch. 1, “Opposition Between the Naturalistic and Personalistic Worlds."


Given Husserl’s method of “reduction” whereby he sets aside the metaphysical status of objects in the natural world (are they mind-independent or merely ideas?), we wanted to see how he accounts for our ability to directly perceive other people’s minds. We don’t just perceive their bodies and our own bodies and deduce that others must be like us, but we perceive both our minds and those of others as strata (aspects) of physical bodies.


Read along with us, starting on p. 183 (PDF p. 101).


You can choose to watch this unedited on video.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 4010 Guattari on Fascism (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/122575355 Mark and Wes read through and discuss the beginning of Felix Guattari's "Everybody Wants to Be a Fascist" (1973). Guattari was a Lacanian psychotherapist, and he argues for explaining fascist tendencies via a "micropolitics of desire," i.e. looking at the individual psychology of fascism instead of merely focusing on sociological, material causes of the rise of fascism. Read along with us. You can choose to watch this on video. To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Tue, 18 Feb 2025 21:44:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts Mark and Wes read through and discuss the beginning of Felix Guattari's "Everybody Wants to Be a Fascist" (1973). Guattari was a Lacanian psychotherapist, and he argues for explaining fascist tendencies via a "micropolitics of desire," i.e. looking at the individual psychology of fascism instead of merely focusing on sociological, material causes of the rise of fascism. Read along with us. You can choose to watch this on video. To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Mark and Wes read through and discuss the beginning of Felix Guattari's "Everybody Wants to Be a Fascist" (1973). Guattari was a Lacanian psychotherapist, and he argues for explaining fascist tendencies via a "micropolitics of desire," i.e. looking at the individual psychology of fascism instead of merely focusing on sociological, material causes of the rise of fascism.


Read along with us.


You can choose to watch this on video.


To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 4217 Marx on Stirner (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/marx-on-stirner-120895442 Mark and Wes read through and discuss Karl Marx's "The German Ideology" (1846), delving deep into the middle of his critique of Max Stirner's "The Ego and Its Own" (recently covered on The Partially Examined Life ep. 358). Marx articulates and criticizes Stirner's attempt to distinguish the mere common egoism of an unthinking person from the enlightened egoism that Stirner is recommending. Read along with us, starting on p. 259 (PDF p. 255). To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Tue, 28 Jan 2025 18:03:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts Mark and Wes read through and discuss Karl Marx's "The German Ideology" (1846), delving deep into the middle of his critique of Max Stirner's "The Ego and Its Own" (recently covered on The Partially Examined Life ep. 358). Marx articulates and criticizes Stirner's attempt to distinguish the mere common egoism of an unthinking person from the enlightened egoism that Stirner is recommending. Read along with us, starting on p. 259 (PDF p. 255). To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Mark and Wes read through and discuss Karl Marx's "The German Ideology" (1846), delving deep into the middle of his critique of Max Stirner's "The Ego and Its Own" (recently covered on The Partially Examined Life ep. 358). Marx articulates and criticizes Stirner's attempt to distinguish the mere common egoism of an unthinking person from the enlightened egoism that Stirner is recommending.


Read along with us, starting on p. 259 (PDF p. 255).


To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3805 Husserl on Essences (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/118885820 Mark and Wes read through and discuss Edmund Husserl's Ideas (1913), ch. 1, "Matter of Fact and Essence" in First Book, "General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology," Part One, "Essence and Eidetic Cognition." This is the book that basically designed phenomenology as a movement, and this part of the reading lays some groundwork by describing what these "essences" that phenomenology studies are, and how they differ from matters of fact. Read along with us, starting on p. 5 (PDF p. 14). To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Sun, 29 Dec 2024 15:36:57 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts Mark and Wes read through and discuss Edmund Husserl's Ideas (1913), ch. 1, "Matter of Fact and Essence" in First Book, "General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology," Part One, "Essence and Eidetic Cognition." This is the book that basically designed phenomenology as a movement, and this part of the reading lays some groundwork by describing what these "essences" that phenomenology studies are, and how they differ from matters of fact. Read along with us, starting on p. 5 (PDF p. 14). To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Mark and Wes read through and discuss Edmund Husserl's Ideas (1913), ch. 1, "Matter of Fact and Essence" in First Book, "General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology," Part One, "Essence and Eidetic Cognition."

This is the book that basically designed phenomenology as a movement, and this part of the reading lays some groundwork by describing what these "essences" that phenomenology studies are, and how they differ from matters of fact.

Read along with us, starting on p. 5 (PDF p. 14).

To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 4046 Mill on Induction (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/117447348 We're discussing John Stuart Mill's A System of Logic (1843), specifically from Book III, "Of Induction," ch. 8, "Of the Four Methods of Experimental Inquiry." What is induction, and why is it part of logic? Science doesn't just observe regularities, but tries to isolate what is connected with what through a combination of experiments and observations. Read along with us, starting on p. 278, i.e. PDF p. 284. To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Fri, 06 Dec 2024 18:33:34 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts We're discussing John Stuart Mill's A System of Logic (1843), specifically from Book III, "Of Induction," ch. 8, "Of the Four Methods of Experimental Inquiry." What is induction, and why is it part of logic? Science doesn't just observe regularities, but tries to isolate what is connected with what through a combination of experiments and observations. Read along with us, starting on p. 278, i.e. PDF p. 284. To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices We're discussing John Stuart Mill's A System of Logic (1843), specifically from Book III, "Of Induction," ch. 8, "Of the Four Methods of Experimental Inquiry." What is induction, and why is it part of logic? Science doesn't just observe regularities, but tries to isolate what is connected with what through a combination of experiments and observations.

Read along with us, starting on p. 278, i.e. PDF p. 284.

To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3542 Sartre on Nothingness (Part Two) https://www.patreon.com/posts/116015450 We continue reading Part One of Being and Nothingness, with ch. 2, "Negations." We get some context and then jump into the classic question of whether existence in itself is just pure being, such that nothingness is just a result of human judgments on it, or whether nothingness is something objective that we grasp. We end by introducing the famous "absent Pierre in the café" example. Read along with us, starting on p. 36, i.e. PDF p. 87. To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 14 Nov 2024 21:26:17 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts We continue reading Part One of Being and Nothingness, with ch. 2, "Negations." We get some context and then jump into the classic question of whether existence in itself is just pure being, such that nothingness is just a result of human judgments on it, or whether nothingness is something objective that we grasp. We end by introducing the famous "absent Pierre in the café" example. Read along with us, starting on p. 36, i.e. PDF p. 87. To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices We continue reading Part One of Being and Nothingness, with ch. 2, "Negations." We get some context and then jump into the classic question of whether existence in itself is just pure being, such that nothingness is just a result of human judgments on it, or whether nothingness is something objective that we grasp. We end by introducing the famous "absent Pierre in the café" example.

Read along with us, starting on p. 36, i.e. PDF p. 87.

To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3962 Sartre on Nothingness (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/115428959 We skip the introduction of Being and Nothingness (1943) and start with Part One, "The Problem of Nothingness," Ch. 1, "The Origin of Negation." Read along with us, starting on p. 33, i.e. PDF p. 84. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Tue, 05 Nov 2024 18:47:53 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts We skip the introduction of Being and Nothingness (1943) and start with Part One, "The Problem of Nothingness," Ch. 1, "The Origin of Negation." Read along with us, starting on p. 33, i.e. PDF p. 84. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices We skip the introduction of Being and Nothingness (1943) and start with Part One, "The Problem of Nothingness," Ch. 1, "The Origin of Negation."

Read along with us, starting on p. 33, i.e. PDF p. 84.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3271 F.H. Bradley's "Appearance and Reality" (Part Two) https://www.patreon.com/posts/114255488 We begin Bradley's argument for idealism: The world as we perceive it is appearance, not reality. In ch. 1, "Primary and Secondary Qualities," we see him give Locke's arguments for the distinction and Berkeley's response that both alike are in the mind, not the world. We try to make sense of this given our recent reading for The Partially Examined Life of Thomas Reid, who argued for realism against Berkeley and others. Read along with us, starting on p. 17. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Fri, 18 Oct 2024 17:37:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts We begin Bradley's argument for idealism: The world as we perceive it is appearance, not reality. In ch. 1, "Primary and Secondary Qualities," we see him give Locke's arguments for the distinction and Berkeley's response that both alike are in the mind, not the world. We try to make sense of this given our recent reading for The Partially Examined Life of Thomas Reid, who argued for realism against Berkeley and others. Read along with us, starting on p. 17. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices We begin Bradley's argument for idealism: The world as we perceive it is appearance, not reality. In ch. 1, "Primary and Secondary Qualities," we see him give Locke's arguments for the distinction and Berkeley's response that both alike are in the mind, not the world.

We try to make sense of this given our recent reading for The Partially Examined Life of Thomas Reid, who argued for realism against Berkeley and others.

Read along with us, starting on p. 17.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3980 F.H. Bradley's "Appearance and Reality" (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/f-h-bradleys-and-113809479 Bradley was a prominent British Hegelian, best known now for being the springboard for Bertrand Russell, who was initially a follower but then rejected idealism entirely to co-create what is now known as analytic philosophy. Today we read just the Introduction to this massive 1893 tome, where Bradley argues that metaphysics is possible and worthwhile. Read along with us, starting on PDF p. 5. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Fri, 11 Oct 2024 21:31:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts Bradley was a prominent British Hegelian, best known now for being the springboard for Bertrand Russell, who was initially a follower but then rejected idealism entirely to co-create what is now known as analytic philosophy. Today we read just the Introduction to this massive 1893 tome, where Bradley argues that metaphysics is possible and worthwhile. Read along with us, starting on PDF p. 5. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Bradley was a prominent British Hegelian, best known now for being the springboard for Bertrand Russell, who was initially a follower but then rejected idealism entirely to co-create what is now known as analytic philosophy. Today we read just the Introduction to this massive 1893 tome, where Bradley argues that metaphysics is possible and worthwhile.

Read along with us, starting on PDF p. 5.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3845 Heidegger on Technology (Part Two) https://www.patreon.com/posts/109355758 We move from the discussion of the four types of causes, to "disclosure," to an environmental critique. Read along with us starting on p. 10. To get parts 3-5, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Wed, 02 Oct 2024 21:47:33 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts We move from the discussion of the four types of causes, to "disclosure," to an environmental critique. Read along with us starting on p. 10. To get parts 3-5, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices We move from the discussion of the four types of causes, to "disclosure," to an environmental critique.

Read along with us starting on p. 10.

To get parts 3-5, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3868 Heidegger on Technology (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/108796594 What is technology, REALLY? People think of it as neutral, as something that can be used for good or misused, but what is it really to be a TOOL in such a way? Heidegger analyzes causality itself, arguing that our modern emphasis on the mechanical (efficient) cause of something is impoverished as compared to Aristotle's. Read along with us starting on PDF p. 38: (p. 4 in the text). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 26 Sep 2024 05:00:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts What is technology, REALLY? People think of it as neutral, as something that can be used for good or misused, but what is it really to be a TOOL in such a way? Heidegger analyzes causality itself, arguing that our modern emphasis on the mechanical (efficient) cause of something is impoverished as compared to Aristotle's. Read along with us starting on PDF p. 38: (p. 4 in the text). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices What is technology, REALLY? People think of it as neutral, as something that can be used for good or misused, but what is it really to be a TOOL in such a way? Heidegger analyzes causality itself, arguing that our modern emphasis on the mechanical (efficient) cause of something is impoverished as compared to Aristotle's.

Read along with us starting on PDF p. 38: (p. 4 in the text).

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3823 William James on Asceticism and Saints (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/108082662 On "The Varieties of Religious Experience," the conclusion of lecture 15. Why do some saintly types engage in ascetic practices like voluntary poverty? James thinks we could all do with some self-discipline of this sort, as extreme as the examples of literary saints may be. Self-denial is a less destructive way of expressing a martial character than actually going to war. Read along with us, starting on p. 352 (PDF p. 369). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Wed, 18 Sep 2024 14:18:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts On "The Varieties of Religious Experience," the conclusion of lecture 15. Why do some saintly types engage in ascetic practices like voluntary poverty? James thinks we could all do with some self-discipline of this sort, as extreme as the examples of literary saints may be. Self-denial is a less destructive way of expressing a martial character than actually going to war. Read along with us, starting on p. 352 (PDF p. 369). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices On "The Varieties of Religious Experience," the conclusion of lecture 15. Why do some saintly types engage in ascetic practices like voluntary poverty? James thinks we could all do with some self-discipline of this sort, as extreme as the examples of literary saints may be. Self-denial is a less destructive way of expressing a martial character than actually going to war.

Read along with us, starting on p. 352 (PDF p. 369).

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3731 Plotinus on The Intelligence (Part Two) https://www.patreon.com/posts/107120583 On "The Intelligence, The Ideas, and Being," starting on section 6. What is "The Intelligence" anyway? How does its storehouse of Forms get into the material world? Read along with us, starting on p. 51. To get part 3, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 12 Sep 2024 15:47:49 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts On "The Intelligence, The Ideas, and Being," starting on section 6. What is "The Intelligence" anyway? How does its storehouse of Forms get into the material world? Read along with us, starting on p. 51. To get part 3, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices On "The Intelligence, The Ideas, and Being," starting on section 6. What is "The Intelligence" anyway? How does its storehouse of Forms get into the material world?

Read along with us, starting on p. 51.

To get part 3, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3752 Plotinus on The Intelligence (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/106497202 On "The Intelligence, The Ideas, and Being" from the Enneads (270 C.E.), about the various elements of Neo-Platonist cosmology: You've got The One, which is so awesome that it has literally no properties (so you can't even say it's awesome), then The Intelligence, which is the repository of the Forms (these first two together serve the same function as Aristotle's Unmoved Mover), then The Soul (the World Soul) that actually exists in time and creates things, then lots of little souls, individual Forms that are transmitted around via "the seminal reasons," and the grubby material world that nonetheless may have received enough Form to make us look up the chain of Being toward its divine elements. Read along with us, starting on p. 46 (PDF p. 48). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Tue, 10 Sep 2024 15:47:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts On "The Intelligence, The Ideas, and Being" from the Enneads (270 C.E.), about the various elements of Neo-Platonist cosmology: You've got The One, which is so awesome that it has literally no properties (so you can't even say it's awesome), then The Intelligence, which is the repository of the Forms (these first two together serve the same function as Aristotle's Unmoved Mover), then The Soul (the World Soul) that actually exists in time and creates things, then lots of little souls, individual Forms that are transmitted around via "the seminal reasons," and the grubby material world that nonetheless may have received enough Form to make us look up the chain of Being toward its divine elements. Read along with us, starting on p. 46 (PDF p. 48). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices On "The Intelligence, The Ideas, and Being" from the Enneads (270 C.E.), about the various elements of Neo-Platonist cosmology: You've got The One, which is so awesome that it has literally no properties (so you can't even say it's awesome), then The Intelligence, which is the repository of the Forms (these first two together serve the same function as Aristotle's Unmoved Mover), then The Soul (the World Soul) that actually exists in time and creates things, then lots of little souls, individual Forms that are transmitted around via "the seminal reasons," and the grubby material world that nonetheless may have received enough Form to make us look up the chain of Being toward its divine elements.

Read along with us, starting on p. 46 (PDF p. 48).

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3437 Merleau-Ponty on the Body (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/111483357 We begin a long series on Maurice Merleau Ponty's "Phenomenology of Perception" (1945), focusing on Part I, "The Body": "Experience and Objective Thought." M-P talks first about what seeing an object (like a house) in the world involves. It pre-supposes a relation to us as perceivers, which involves our situatedness in a body. Yet when we make our own body into an objective object in space and time (like the house), we've shifted it from this primordial center of perception into something described like perception. What is involved in this shift?  Read along with us, starting on p. 77 (PDF p. 102). To get the subsequent 4 parts of this series, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 05 Sep 2024 18:15:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts We begin a long series on Maurice Merleau Ponty's "Phenomenology of Perception" (1945), focusing on Part I, "The Body": "Experience and Objective Thought." M-P talks first about what seeing an object (like a house) in the world involves. It pre-supposes a relation to us as perceivers, which involves our situatedness in a body. Yet when we make our own body into an objective object in space and time (like the house), we've shifted it from this primordial center of perception into something described like perception. What is involved in this shift?  Read along with us, starting on p. 77 (PDF p. 102). To get the subsequent 4 parts of this series, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices We begin a long series on Maurice Merleau Ponty's "Phenomenology of Perception" (1945), focusing on Part I, "The Body": "Experience and Objective Thought." M-P talks first about what seeing an object (like a house) in the world involves. It pre-supposes a relation to us as perceivers, which involves our situatedness in a body. Yet when we make our own body into an objective object in space and time (like the house), we've shifted it from this primordial center of perception into something described like perception. What is involved in this shift?

 Read along with us, starting on p. 77 (PDF p. 102).

To get the subsequent 4 parts of this series, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 4210 Levinas on Buber (Part Two) https://www.patreon.com/posts/105311402 Continuing on "Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge," with the "Experience and Meeting" section, whereby we try to make sense of the theory that the self is metaphysically a relation to other people. How does a model of philosophy based on the cogito (first person perception) necessarily objectify other people? How does speaking "to" someone provide a break from this intentional (objectifying) speaking "of" others? Does this relation to others actually require language? Is bringing in animals off-limits in talking about the phenomenology of consciousness? Read along with us, starting on p. 63. To get parts 3 and 4, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 29 Aug 2024 05:00:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts Continuing on "Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge," with the "Experience and Meeting" section, whereby we try to make sense of the theory that the self is metaphysically a relation to other people. How does a model of philosophy based on the cogito (first person perception) necessarily objectify other people? How does speaking "to" someone provide a break from this intentional (objectifying) speaking "of" others? Does this relation to others actually require language? Is bringing in animals off-limits in talking about the phenomenology of consciousness? Read along with us, starting on p. 63. To get parts 3 and 4, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Continuing on "Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge," with the "Experience and Meeting" section, whereby we try to make sense of the theory that the self is metaphysically a relation to other people. How does a model of philosophy based on the cogito (first person perception) necessarily objectify other people? How does speaking "to" someone provide a break from this intentional (objectifying) speaking "of" others? Does this relation to others actually require language? Is bringing in animals off-limits in talking about the phenomenology of consciousness?

Read along with us, starting on p. 63.

To get parts 3 and 4, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 4584 Levinas on Buber (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/104850501 We read the first pages of Emmanuel Levinas' 1958 article, "Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge." In these initial sections, subtitled "The Problem of Truth" and "From the Object to Being," he's recounting how Heideggerian phenomenology argued that being (including our unarticulated awareness of being) is more fundamental than knowledge (a verbalized, objectifying attitude toward the world attributed to a tradition initiated by Descartes). Read along with us, starting on p. 60 (PDF p. 66). For more about Levinas, you can listen to PEL eps. 145 and 146, plus ep. 71 on Buber. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Tue, 27 Aug 2024 05:00:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts We read the first pages of Emmanuel Levinas' 1958 article, "Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge." In these initial sections, subtitled "The Problem of Truth" and "From the Object to Being," he's recounting how Heideggerian phenomenology argued that being (including our unarticulated awareness of being) is more fundamental than knowledge (a verbalized, objectifying attitude toward the world attributed to a tradition initiated by Descartes). Read along with us, starting on p. 60 (PDF p. 66). For more about Levinas, you can listen to PEL eps. 145 and 146, plus ep. 71 on Buber. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices We read the first pages of Emmanuel Levinas' 1958 article, "Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge."

In these initial sections, subtitled "The Problem of Truth" and "From the Object to Being," he's recounting how Heideggerian phenomenology argued that being (including our unarticulated awareness of being) is more fundamental than knowledge (a verbalized, objectifying attitude toward the world attributed to a tradition initiated by Descartes).

Read along with us, starting on p. 60 (PDF p. 66).

For more about Levinas, you can listen to PEL eps. 145 and 146, plus ep. 71 on Buber.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3842 Peter Railton's "Moral Realism" (Part Two) https://www.patreon.com/posts/103573916 We discuss the fact-value distinction, both with regard to ethics but also epistemology, i.e. how the search for facts depends on what we're looking for. Read along with us, starting on p. 6. To get part 3, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Fri, 23 Aug 2024 00:10:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts We discuss the fact-value distinction, both with regard to ethics but also epistemology, i.e. how the search for facts depends on what we're looking for. Read along with us, starting on p. 6. To get part 3, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices We discuss the fact-value distinction, both with regard to ethics but also epistemology, i.e. how the search for facts depends on what we're looking for.

Read along with us, starting on p. 6.

To get part 3, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy.

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]]> 4242 Peter Railton's "Moral Realism" (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/103099676 We're reading a 1984 essay by Mark's U. of Michigan undergrad advisor, included among the most cited philosophy papers in some list that Wes found. Railton's goal is to give a naturalistic account of ethics (i.e. ethics within a framework of natural science) that both connects tightly to observed empirical facts and also makes moral facts real parts of our world, not merely reducible to non-moral facts about pleasure, social norms, or the like. In this first part, Railton lays out what naturalism in ethics amounts to and begins to explain why past empiricists like Hume don't provide an account of morality that is adequately normative: Merely describing what people tend to shoot for doesn't explain why such a norm is binding on us. Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Tue, 20 Aug 2024 22:45:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts We're reading a 1984 essay by Mark's U. of Michigan undergrad advisor, included among the most cited philosophy papers in some list that Wes found. Railton's goal is to give a naturalistic account of ethics (i.e. ethics within a framework of natural science) that both connects tightly to observed empirical facts and also makes moral facts real parts of our world, not merely reducible to non-moral facts about pleasure, social norms, or the like. In this first part, Railton lays out what naturalism in ethics amounts to and begins to explain why past empiricists like Hume don't provide an account of morality that is adequately normative: Merely describing what people tend to shoot for doesn't explain why such a norm is binding on us. Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices We're reading a 1984 essay by Mark's U. of Michigan undergrad advisor, included among the most cited philosophy papers in some list that Wes found. Railton's goal is to give a naturalistic account of ethics (i.e. ethics within a framework of natural science) that both connects tightly to observed empirical facts and also makes moral facts real parts of our world, not merely reducible to non-moral facts about pleasure, social norms, or the like.

In this first part, Railton lays out what naturalism in ethics amounts to and begins to explain why past empiricists like Hume don't provide an account of morality that is adequately normative: Merely describing what people tend to shoot for doesn't explain why such a norm is binding on us.

Read along with us.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3965 Descartes' "Passions of the Soul" (Part Two) https://www.patreon.com/posts/101320525 Continuing on this text about the mechanics of how mind and body work together. Is this schematically useful or hopelessly archaic? You decide! Read along with us, starting at article 22. To get parts 3 and 4, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 15 Aug 2024 12:41:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts Continuing on this text about the mechanics of how mind and body work together. Is this schematically useful or hopelessly archaic? You decide! Read along with us, starting at article 22. To get parts 3 and 4, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Continuing on this text about the mechanics of how mind and body work together. Is this schematically useful or hopelessly archaic? You decide!

Read along with us, starting at article 22.

To get parts 3 and 4, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy.

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]]> 4354 Descartes' "Passions of the Soul" (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/100806249 We're reading the final text by René Descartes, published in 1649, about how mind and body relate to each other. Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Tue, 13 Aug 2024 12:40:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts We're reading the final text by René Descartes, published in 1649, about how mind and body relate to each other. Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices We're reading the final text by René Descartes, published in 1649, about how mind and body relate to each other.

Read along with us.

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]]> 3896 Isaiah Berlin on Liberty (Part Two) https://www.patreon.com/posts/99532294 Continuing on "Two Concepts of Liberty" (1969), we finish up the negative conception ("freedom from") and give Berlin's strange account of positive freedom ("freedom to"), which involves an identification of some part of you (e.g. for Plato, your rationality), the obeying of which makes you free, even if what you "want" goes against this. Read along with us, starting on p. 20. To get parts 3 and 4, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 08 Aug 2024 22:00:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts Continuing on "Two Concepts of Liberty" (1969), we finish up the negative conception ("freedom from") and give Berlin's strange account of positive freedom ("freedom to"), which involves an identification of some part of you (e.g. for Plato, your rationality), the obeying of which makes you free, even if what you "want" goes against this. Read along with us, starting on p. 20. To get parts 3 and 4, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Continuing on "Two Concepts of Liberty" (1969), we finish up the negative conception ("freedom from") and give Berlin's strange account of positive freedom ("freedom to"), which involves an identification of some part of you (e.g. for Plato, your rationality), the obeying of which makes you free, even if what you "want" goes against this.

Read along with us, starting on p. 20.

To get parts 3 and 4, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy.

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]]> 4033 Isaiah Berlin on Liberty (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/99014868 We're reading through the beginning of "Two Concepts of Liberty" (1969). What are the various ways we can conceive of freedom, and is the concept necessarily political? Can you legitimately say you've been deprived freedom because, e.g., you can't afford some necessity? Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Tue, 06 Aug 2024 20:07:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts We're reading through the beginning of "Two Concepts of Liberty" (1969). What are the various ways we can conceive of freedom, and is the concept necessarily political? Can you legitimately say you've been deprived freedom because, e.g., you can't afford some necessity? Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices We're reading through the beginning of "Two Concepts of Liberty" (1969). What are the various ways we can conceive of freedom, and is the concept necessarily political? Can you legitimately say you've been deprived freedom because, e.g., you can't afford some necessity?

Read along with us.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3991 Aristotle Against Platonic Forms (Part Two) https://www.patreon.com/posts/98528996 Continuing on Aristotle's Metaphysics, book 1, ch. 9. Why does Aristotle insist that Forms have to be in objects, contra Plato? What would it mean for the Forms to be mathematical objects per the Pythagoreans' view? Read along with us starting on p. 23. At some point we'll return to Aristotle's take on Plato's forms via his treatment later in the look, but this is enough of Chapter 9! Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 01 Aug 2024 18:00:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts Continuing on Aristotle's Metaphysics, book 1, ch. 9. Why does Aristotle insist that Forms have to be in objects, contra Plato? What would it mean for the Forms to be mathematical objects per the Pythagoreans' view? Read along with us starting on p. 23. At some point we'll return to Aristotle's take on Plato's forms via his treatment later in the look, but this is enough of Chapter 9! Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Continuing on Aristotle's Metaphysics, book 1, ch. 9. Why does Aristotle insist that Forms have to be in objects, contra Plato? What would it mean for the Forms to be mathematical objects per the Pythagoreans' view?

Read along with us starting on p. 23.

At some point we'll return to Aristotle's take on Plato's forms via his treatment later in the look, but this is enough of Chapter 9!

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]]> 4564 Aristotle Against Platonic Forms (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/98156152 Aristotle offers a critique of Plato's theory of forms at a few points in his Metaphysics, and in this and the following part of this series, we'll be tackling this by reading part of book 1, ch. 9. Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Tue, 30 Jul 2024 16:31:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts Aristotle offers a critique of Plato's theory of forms at a few points in his Metaphysics, and in this and the following part of this series, we'll be tackling this by reading part of book 1, ch. 9. Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Aristotle offers a critique of Plato's theory of forms at a few points in his Metaphysics, and in this and the following part of this series, we'll be tackling this by reading part of book 1, ch. 9.

Read along with us.

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]]> 4060 Al-Kindi on Dispelling Sorrows (Part Two) https://www.patreon.com/posts/al-kindi-on-part-97189252 Continuing on Yaqub ibn Ishaq Al-Kindi's Islamic, Stoic-flavored ethical treatise. What habits should we instill that will immunize us against loss? What constitutes enough mourning? How does a feeling of loss go away, and can (and should) we hasten this? Read along with us, starting on p. 124. To get part 3, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 25 Jul 2024 16:00:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts Continuing on Yaqub ibn Ishaq Al-Kindi's Islamic, Stoic-flavored ethical treatise. What habits should we instill that will immunize us against loss? What constitutes enough mourning? How does a feeling of loss go away, and can (and should) we hasten this? Read along with us, starting on p. 124. To get part 3, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Continuing on Yaqub ibn Ishaq Al-Kindi's Islamic, Stoic-flavored ethical treatise. What habits should we instill that will immunize us against loss? What constitutes enough mourning? How does a feeling of loss go away, and can (and should) we hasten this?

Read along with us, starting on p. 124.

To get part 3, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy.

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]]> 3625 Al-Kindi on Dispelling Sorrows (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/al-kindi-on-part-96699982 We're reading a 9th century Arabic philosopher (from what's now Iraq), in fact the "father of Arab philosophy," Yaqub ibn Ishaq Al-Kindi, writing about how we can immunize ourselves to the sorrows of life through some means akin to Stoicism, which Al-Kindi as scholar of the Greeks knew all about. Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Tue, 23 Jul 2024 14:18:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts We're reading a 9th century Arabic philosopher (from what's now Iraq), in fact the "father of Arab philosophy," Yaqub ibn Ishaq Al-Kindi, writing about how we can immunize ourselves to the sorrows of life through some means akin to Stoicism, which Al-Kindi as scholar of the Greeks knew all about. Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices We're reading a 9th century Arabic philosopher (from what's now Iraq), in fact the "father of Arab philosophy," Yaqub ibn Ishaq Al-Kindi, writing about how we can immunize ourselves to the sorrows of life through some means akin to Stoicism, which Al-Kindi as scholar of the Greeks knew all about.

Read along with us.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3745 Hegel on Jesus and Kant (Part Two) https://www.patreon.com/posts/94721665 Continuing on "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate," ch. 2: "The Moral Teaching of Jesus: The Sermon on the Mount Contrasted with the Mosaic Law and with Kant’s Ethics." Read along with us, PDF p. 228 (text p. 210). To get parts 3-5, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Fri, 19 Jul 2024 15:00:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts Continuing on "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate," ch. 2: "The Moral Teaching of Jesus: The Sermon on the Mount Contrasted with the Mosaic Law and with Kant’s Ethics." Read along with us, PDF p. 228 (text p. 210). To get parts 3-5, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Continuing on "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate," ch. 2: "The Moral Teaching of Jesus: The Sermon on the Mount Contrasted with the Mosaic Law and with Kant’s Ethics."

Read along with us, PDF p. 228 (text p. 210).

To get parts 3-5, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy.

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]]> 4405 Hegel on Jesus and Kant (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/94270324 We're reading an early Hegel essay, "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate," ch. 2: "The Moral Teaching of Jesus: The Sermon on the Mount Contrasted with the Mosaic Law and with Kant’s Ethics." Here Hegel describes how Jesus' ethics broke with Judaism. Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Tue, 16 Jul 2024 14:09:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts We're reading an early Hegel essay, "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate," ch. 2: "The Moral Teaching of Jesus: The Sermon on the Mount Contrasted with the Mosaic Law and with Kant’s Ethics." Here Hegel describes how Jesus' ethics broke with Judaism. Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices We're reading an early Hegel essay, "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate," ch. 2: "The Moral Teaching of Jesus: The Sermon on the Mount Contrasted with the Mosaic Law and with Kant’s Ethics." Here Hegel describes how Jesus' ethics broke with Judaism. Read along with us.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 4464 Kierkegaard on Irony (Part Two) https://www.patreon.com/posts/93685903 We complete our treatment of Soren Kierkegaard's On the Concept of Irony (1841), "Irony as a Controlled Element, the Truth of Irony." How can a controlled level of irony help us gain health and truth? Read along with us, starting at PDF p. 324 in the middle. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 11 Jul 2024 14:00:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts We complete our treatment of Soren Kierkegaard's On the Concept of Irony (1841), "Irony as a Controlled Element, the Truth of Irony." How can a controlled level of irony help us gain health and truth? Read along with us, starting at PDF p. 324 in the middle. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices We complete our treatment of Soren Kierkegaard's On the Concept of Irony (1841), "Irony as a Controlled Element, the Truth of Irony." How can a controlled level of irony help us gain health and truth?

Read along with us, starting at PDF p. 324 in the middle.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 4191 Kierkegaard on Irony (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/93217984 We read the conclusion to Soren Kierkegaard's On the Concept of Irony (1841), "Irony as a Controlled Element, the Truth of Irony." The discussion starts with the role of irony in good art, and then moves on to discuss the proper role of irony as an existential strategy in a well-grounded, thoughtful life. Read along with us, starting at PDF p. 321. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Tue, 09 Jul 2024 12:59:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts We read the conclusion to Soren Kierkegaard's On the Concept of Irony (1841), "Irony as a Controlled Element, the Truth of Irony." The discussion starts with the role of irony in good art, and then moves on to discuss the proper role of irony as an existential strategy in a well-grounded, thoughtful life. Read along with us, starting at PDF p. 321. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices We read the conclusion to Soren Kierkegaard's On the Concept of Irony (1841), "Irony as a Controlled Element, the Truth of Irony." The discussion starts with the role of irony in good art, and then moves on to discuss the proper role of irony as an existential strategy in a well-grounded, thoughtful life.

Read along with us, starting at PDF p. 321.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3475 Hume on Passions (Part Two) https://www.patreon.com/posts/91657024 On Book II of A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Part I, "Pride and Humility," sections 3 and 4. Pride, according to Hume, has both a cause (whatever you're proud of) and an object (the self). Hume describes this structure as both "natural" (as opposed to being a social construction) and "original" (based on an innate psychological capacity). Pride involves both impressions (e.g. you perceive that you find pleasure in whatever you're proud of), and ideas (e.g. you understand the relation of the thing we're proud of to yourself). For both of these types of mental entities, pride or any other emotion will also involve associated ideas and impressions; pride in something will make us think of other things, and feeling pride about a particular thing gives rise to related feelings, e.g. pride in those other things. We switched which edition of the text we were reading since part one. Read along with us, starting on PDF p. 201. To get parts 3-5, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 04 Jul 2024 12:00:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts On Book II of A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Part I, "Pride and Humility," sections 3 and 4. Pride, according to Hume, has both a cause (whatever you're proud of) and an object (the self). Hume describes this structure as both "natural" (as opposed to being a social construction) and "original" (based on an innate psychological capacity). Pride involves both impressions (e.g. you perceive that you find pleasure in whatever you're proud of), and ideas (e.g. you understand the relation of the thing we're proud of to yourself). For both of these types of mental entities, pride or any other emotion will also involve associated ideas and impressions; pride in something will make us think of other things, and feeling pride about a particular thing gives rise to related feelings, e.g. pride in those other things. We switched which edition of the text we were reading since part one. Read along with us, starting on PDF p. 201. To get parts 3-5, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices On Book II of A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Part I, "Pride and Humility," sections 3 and 4. Pride, according to Hume, has both a cause (whatever you're proud of) and an object (the self). Hume describes this structure as both "natural" (as opposed to being a social construction) and "original" (based on an innate psychological capacity). Pride involves both impressions (e.g. you perceive that you find pleasure in whatever you're proud of), and ideas (e.g. you understand the relation of the thing we're proud of to yourself). For both of these types of mental entities, pride or any other emotion will also involve associated ideas and impressions; pride in something will make us think of other things, and feeling pride about a particular thing gives rise to related feelings, e.g. pride in those other things.

We switched which edition of the text we were reading since part one. Read along with us, starting on PDF p. 201.

To get parts 3-5, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy.

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]]> 4403 Hume on Passions (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/91211936 On Book II of A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), this time reading sections 1 and 2 in Part I, "Pride and Humility." How does David Hume deal with human emotions, given his empiricism that begins with the premise that our minds contain only impressions and ideas (which are mainly different from impressions in that they are fainter, like a memory of an apple as compared to the perception of an apple)? Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Tue, 02 Jul 2024 16:17:20 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts On Book II of A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), this time reading sections 1 and 2 in Part I, "Pride and Humility." How does David Hume deal with human emotions, given his empiricism that begins with the premise that our minds contain only impressions and ideas (which are mainly different from impressions in that they are fainter, like a memory of an apple as compared to the perception of an apple)? Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices On Book II of A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), this time reading sections 1 and 2 in Part I, "Pride and Humility." How does David Hume deal with human emotions, given his empiricism that begins with the premise that our minds contain only impressions and ideas (which are mainly different from impressions in that they are fainter, like a memory of an apple as compared to the perception of an apple)?

Read along with us.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 4139 Forms in Plato's "Republic" (Part Two) https://www.patreon.com/posts/89982250 We complete Plato's "divided line" schema at the end of Book VI of the Republic (and are going to hold off on the actual allegory of the cave in book VII for the time being, so this is the end of this series for now), discussing the "intelligible" realm and Socrates' strange distinction between the "mere hypotheses" of geometry, where the abstract material is based on empirical matters vs. reasoning that relies only on the forms, yet is enabled by dialectic, as opposed to some kind of intellectual intuition directly of those forms. Follow along with us, starting on PDF p. 4. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 27 Jun 2024 11:00:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts We complete Plato's "divided line" schema at the end of Book VI of the Republic (and are going to hold off on the actual allegory of the cave in book VII for the time being, so this is the end of this series for now), discussing the "intelligible" realm and Socrates' strange distinction between the "mere hypotheses" of geometry, where the abstract material is based on empirical matters vs. reasoning that relies only on the forms, yet is enabled by dialectic, as opposed to some kind of intellectual intuition directly of those forms. Follow along with us, starting on PDF p. 4. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices We complete Plato's "divided line" schema at the end of Book VI of the Republic (and are going to hold off on the actual allegory of the cave in book VII for the time being, so this is the end of this series for now), discussing the "intelligible" realm and Socrates' strange distinction between the "mere hypotheses" of geometry, where the abstract material is based on empirical matters vs. reasoning that relies only on the forms, yet is enabled by dialectic, as opposed to some kind of intellectual intuition directly of those forms.

Follow along with us, starting on PDF p. 4.

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]]> 4242 Forms in Plato's "Republic" (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/forms-in-platos-89758547 Toward the end of Book VI and into Book VII of the Republic, Plato gives a series of metaphors for the role "the good itself" plays in our knowledge and values. We read here starting at line 507b of the G.M.A. Grube/C.D.C Reeve translation, where we hear that the form of the good is to our ability to know anything as the sun is to our ability to see anything. We conclude by discussing the first half of Plato's "divided line" image, whose lower half marks off reflections/images and then the material objects that these are images of. Because these are in the lower half, we can't have any real knowledge of them; thus physical science should be impossible. Follow along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Tue, 25 Jun 2024 17:56:26 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts Toward the end of Book VI and into Book VII of the Republic, Plato gives a series of metaphors for the role "the good itself" plays in our knowledge and values. We read here starting at line 507b of the G.M.A. Grube/C.D.C Reeve translation, where we hear that the form of the good is to our ability to know anything as the sun is to our ability to see anything. We conclude by discussing the first half of Plato's "divided line" image, whose lower half marks off reflections/images and then the material objects that these are images of. Because these are in the lower half, we can't have any real knowledge of them; thus physical science should be impossible. Follow along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Toward the end of Book VI and into Book VII of the Republic, Plato gives a series of metaphors for the role "the good itself" plays in our knowledge and values. We read here starting at line 507b of the G.M.A. Grube/C.D.C Reeve translation, where we hear that the form of the good is to our ability to know anything as the sun is to our ability to see anything. We conclude by discussing the first half of Plato's "divided line" image, whose lower half marks off reflections/images and then the material objects that these are images of. Because these are in the lower half, we can't have any real knowledge of them; thus physical science should be impossible.

Follow along with us.

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]]> 4293 Grice's "Logic and Conversation" (Part Two) https://www.patreon.com/posts/89757287 Continuing on the 1975 paper, we describe how the various maxims of Grice's conversational "Cooperative Principle" can be violated in systematic ways to produce conversational implicature. We talk in non-literal ways, yet other people still think we're trying to communicate and successfully understand us. Follow along with us in the text. To get part 3, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 20 Jun 2024 13:00:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts Continuing on the 1975 paper, we describe how the various maxims of Grice's conversational "Cooperative Principle" can be violated in systematic ways to produce conversational implicature. We talk in non-literal ways, yet other people still think we're trying to communicate and successfully understand us. Follow along with us in the text. To get part 3, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Continuing on the 1975 paper, we describe how the various maxims of Grice's conversational "Cooperative Principle" can be violated in systematic ways to produce conversational implicature. We talk in non-literal ways, yet other people still think we're trying to communicate and successfully understand us.

Follow along with us in the text.

To get part 3, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy.

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]]> 3999 Grice's "Logic and Conversation" (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/grices-logic-and-89614099 We read through Paul Grice's 1975 ordinary language philosophy paper. What are the assumptions behind everyday conversation? When someone violates a conversational norm by, e.g., giving too much information or stating something literally untrue, what are the strategies by which we try to make sense of what they're saying as still a sensible contribution to the conversation? Follow along with us in the text. This also serves as part three to The Partially Examined Life's episode #325. However, this should be understandable without listening to any of that. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Tue, 18 Jun 2024 22:04:37 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts We read through Paul Grice's 1975 ordinary language philosophy paper. What are the assumptions behind everyday conversation? When someone violates a conversational norm by, e.g., giving too much information or stating something literally untrue, what are the strategies by which we try to make sense of what they're saying as still a sensible contribution to the conversation? Follow along with us in the text. This also serves as part three to The Partially Examined Life's episode #325. However, this should be understandable without listening to any of that. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices We read through Paul Grice's 1975 ordinary language philosophy paper. What are the assumptions behind everyday conversation? When someone violates a conversational norm by, e.g., giving too much information or stating something literally untrue, what are the strategies by which we try to make sense of what they're saying as still a sensible contribution to the conversation? Follow along with us in the text.

This also serves as part three to The Partially Examined Life's episode #325. However, this should be understandable without listening to any of that.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3801 Epictetus' Discourses (Part Two) https://www.patreon.com/posts/89315277 We read through book one, chapter two. How can a person on every occasion maintain his proper character? Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 13 Jun 2024 11:00:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts We read through book one, chapter two. How can a person on every occasion maintain his proper character? Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices We read through book one, chapter two. How can a person on every occasion maintain his proper character?

Read along with us.

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]]> 4138 Epictetus' Discourses (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/89098606 On Ch. 1 of this classic of ancient Stoicism, a series of informal lectures written down by Epictetus' student Arrian in around 108 C.E. What is it about us that enables self-control? Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Tue, 11 Jun 2024 14:32:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts On Ch. 1 of this classic of ancient Stoicism, a series of informal lectures written down by Epictetus' student Arrian in around 108 C.E. What is it about us that enables self-control? Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices On Ch. 1 of this classic of ancient Stoicism, a series of informal lectures written down by Epictetus' student Arrian in around 108 C.E. What is it about us that enables self-control?

Read along with us.

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]]> 3933 Reason in Hobbes' "Leviathan" (Part Two) https://www.patreon.com/posts/88232759 Continuing on ch. 5 in Thomas Hobbes' "Leviathan" (1651). We go through seven ways of producing absurd reasoning according to Hobbes. Read along with us. Part Three can only be found at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 06 Jun 2024 11:00:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts Continuing on ch. 5 in Thomas Hobbes' "Leviathan" (1651). We go through seven ways of producing absurd reasoning according to Hobbes. Read along with us. Part Three can only be found at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Continuing on ch. 5 in Thomas Hobbes' "Leviathan" (1651). We go through seven ways of producing absurd reasoning according to Hobbes. Read along with us.

Part Three can only be found at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy.

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]]> 4485 Reason in Hobbes' "Leviathan" (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/88081560 Reading ch. 5 in Thomas Hobbes' "Leviathan" (1651) to see how a materialist empiricist with a highly restrictive view of what counts as real knowledge tries to account for our ability to reason. Read along with us (start on p. 16). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Tue, 04 Jun 2024 13:46:20 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts Reading ch. 5 in Thomas Hobbes' "Leviathan" (1651) to see how a materialist empiricist with a highly restrictive view of what counts as real knowledge tries to account for our ability to reason. Read along with us (start on p. 16). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Reading ch. 5 in Thomas Hobbes' "Leviathan" (1651) to see how a materialist empiricist with a highly restrictive view of what counts as real knowledge tries to account for our ability to reason. Read along with us (start on p. 16).

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]]> 4248 Plato's "Cratylus" on Language https://www.patreon.com/posts/platos-cratylus-88879242 On the latter portion of Plato's middle-period dialogue, where Plato argues to Cratylus that even if names (words) were devised to somehow depict the things they stand for, that wouldn't guarantee that they ACCURATELY describe the world. You can't look at the definitions of words to learn about the world; you have to actually investigate the world directly. Follow along with us in the text, starting at the bottom of p. 144. This also serves as part three to The Partially Examined Life's episode #324. However, this should be understandable without listening to any of that. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Wed, 29 May 2024 14:03:35 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts On the latter portion of Plato's middle-period dialogue, where Plato argues to Cratylus that even if names (words) were devised to somehow depict the things they stand for, that wouldn't guarantee that they ACCURATELY describe the world. You can't look at the definitions of words to learn about the world; you have to actually investigate the world directly. Follow along with us in the text, starting at the bottom of p. 144. This also serves as part three to The Partially Examined Life's episode #324. However, this should be understandable without listening to any of that. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices On the latter portion of Plato's middle-period dialogue, where Plato argues to Cratylus that even if names (words) were devised to somehow depict the things they stand for, that wouldn't guarantee that they ACCURATELY describe the world. You can't look at the definitions of words to learn about the world; you have to actually investigate the world directly.

Follow along with us in the text, starting at the bottom of p. 144.

This also serves as part three to The Partially Examined Life's episode #324. However, this should be understandable without listening to any of that.

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]]> 3923 Zhuangzi, Ch. 19 https://www.patreon.com/posts/104375571 We're reading the "Fathoming Life" chapter of this seminal Daoist philosopher, using the Ziporyn translation: Just the first couple pages to really focus in on some text that came up tangentially in Partially Examined Life ep. 341. Read along with us, starting on PDF p. 188. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Mon, 20 May 2024 11:00:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts We're reading the "Fathoming Life" chapter of this seminal Daoist philosopher, using the Ziporyn translation: Just the first couple pages to really focus in on some text that came up tangentially in Partially Examined Life ep. 341. Read along with us, starting on PDF p. 188. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices We're reading the "Fathoming Life" chapter of this seminal Daoist philosopher, using the Ziporyn translation: Just the first couple pages to really focus in on some text that came up tangentially in Partially Examined Life ep. 341.

Read along with us, starting on PDF p. 188.

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]]> 4154 Hegel on Spinoza (Part Two) https://www.patreon.com/posts/hegel-on-spinoza-87540329 We're continuing reading through the entry on Spinoza from Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy (1830). Let's Make Philosophy Mathematical Again! Read along with us. Part Three can only be found at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Fri, 17 May 2024 15:58:00 -0000 full Evergreen Podcasts We're continuing reading through the entry on Spinoza from Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy (1830). Let's Make Philosophy Mathematical Again! Read along with us. Part Three can only be found at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices We're continuing reading through the entry on Spinoza from Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy (1830). Let's Make Philosophy Mathematical Again!

Read along with us.

Part Three can only be found at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 3874 Hegel on Spinoza (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/87539588 We read through the Spinoza entry in Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy (1830). Does this tell us more about Spinoza, or about Hegel? Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Mon, 13 May 2024 02:22:00 -0000 Hegel on Spinoza (Part One) full Evergreen Podcasts We read through the Spinoza entry in Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy (1830). Does this tell us more about Spinoza, or about Hegel? Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices We read through the Spinoza entry in Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy (1830). Does this tell us more about Spinoza, or about Hegel?

Read along with us.

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]]> 3626 Emerson's Oversoul (Part Two) https://www.patreon.com/posts/87680012 We're continuing to go through Ralph Waldo Emerson's 1841 essay "The Over-Soul." What is this godhood allegedly in us that transcends time and space? Read along with us. Parts Three and Four can only be found at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Thu, 09 May 2024 22:20:00 -0000 Emerson's Oversoul (Part Two) full Evergreen Podcasts We're continuing to go through Ralph Waldo Emerson's 1841 essay "The Over-Soul." What is this godhood allegedly in us that transcends time and space? Read along with us. Parts Three and Four can only be found at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices We're continuing to go through Ralph Waldo Emerson's 1841 essay "The Over-Soul." What is this godhood allegedly in us that transcends time and space? Read along with us.

Parts Three and Four can only be found at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy.

Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

]]> 4352 Emerson's Oversoul (Part One) https://www.patreon.com/posts/emersons-audio-87671236 Are we underlyingly all really a single, unified organism? Or do we just have a lot in common? We begin unraveling this puzzling claim by reading Ralph Waldo Emerson’s 1841 essay “The Over-Soul.” Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Mon, 06 May 2024 21:14:00 -0000 Emerson's Oversoul (Part One) full Evergreen Podcasts Are we underlyingly all really a single, unified organism? Or do we just have a lot in common? We begin unraveling this puzzling claim by reading Ralph Waldo Emerson’s 1841 essay “The Over-Soul.” Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Are we underlyingly all really a single, unified organism? Or do we just have a lot in common? We begin unraveling this puzzling claim by reading Ralph Waldo Emerson’s 1841 essay “The Over-Soul.” Read along with us.

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]]> 3482 Closereads: Philosophy with Mark and Wes - A Quick Intro Reading through difficult philosophy texts line-by-line to try to figure out what’s really being said. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Wed, 01 May 2024 17:55:00 -0000 trailer Evergreen Podcasts Reading through difficult philosophy texts line-by-line to try to figure out what’s really being said. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Reading through difficult philosophy texts line-by-line to try to figure out what’s really being said.

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