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    <title>New Books in Philosophy of Medicine</title>
    <language>en</language>
    <copyright></copyright>
    <description>Interviews with authors and scholars of the philosophy of medicine.

This channel is sponsored by the Centre for Philosophy of Epidemiology, Medicine, and Public Health, a platform for interdisciplinary research into the philosophical aspects of human health. CPEMPH is a joint venture between Durham University and the University of Johannesburg.

This podcast is a channel on the New Books Network. The New Books Network is an academic audio library dedicated to public education. In each episode you will hear scholars discuss their recently published research with another expert in their field.

Discover our 150+ channels and browse our 28,000+ episodes on our website:&amp;nbsp;⁠newbooksnetwork.com⁠

Subscribe to our free weekly Substack newsletter to get informative, engaging content straight to your inbox:&amp;nbsp;⁠https://newbooksnetwork.substack.com/⁠

Follow us on Instagram and Bluesky to learn about more our latest interviews: @newbooksnetwork</description>
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      <title>New Books in Philosophy of Medicine</title>
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    <itunes:type>episodic</itunes:type>
    <itunes:subtitle></itunes:subtitle>
    <itunes:author>Marshall Poe</itunes:author>
    <itunes:summary>Interviews with authors and scholars of the philosophy of medicine.

This channel is sponsored by the Centre for Philosophy of Epidemiology, Medicine, and Public Health, a platform for interdisciplinary research into the philosophical aspects of human health. CPEMPH is a joint venture between Durham University and the University of Johannesburg.

This podcast is a channel on the New Books Network. The New Books Network is an academic audio library dedicated to public education. In each episode you will hear scholars discuss their recently published research with another expert in their field.

Discover our 150+ channels and browse our 28,000+ episodes on our website:&amp;nbsp;⁠newbooksnetwork.com⁠

Subscribe to our free weekly Substack newsletter to get informative, engaging content straight to your inbox:&amp;nbsp;⁠https://newbooksnetwork.substack.com/⁠

Follow us on Instagram and Bluesky to learn about more our latest interviews: @newbooksnetwork</itunes:summary>
    <content:encoded>
      <![CDATA[<p>Interviews with authors and scholars of the philosophy of medicine.</p>
<p>This channel is sponsored by the <a href="https://cpemph.org/">Centre for Philosophy of Epidemiology, Medicine, and Public Health</a>, a platform for interdisciplinary research into the philosophical aspects of human health. CPEMPH is a joint venture between <a href="https://www.durham.ac.uk/">Durham University</a> and the <a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/">University of Johannesburg</a>.</p>
<p>This podcast is a channel on the New Books Network. The New Books Network is an academic audio library dedicated to public education. In each episode you will hear scholars discuss their recently published research with another expert in their field.</p>
<p>Discover our 150+ channels and browse our 28,000+ episodes on our website:&nbsp;<a href="http://newbooksnetwork.com/">⁠<u>newbooksnetwork.com</u>⁠</a></p>
<p>Subscribe to our free weekly Substack newsletter to get informative, engaging content straight to your inbox:&nbsp;<a href="https://newbooksnetwork.substack.com/">⁠<u>https://newbooksnetwork.substack.com/</u>⁠</a></p>
<p>Follow us on Instagram and Bluesky to learn about more our latest interviews: @newbooksnetwork</p>]]>
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    <itunes:owner>
      <itunes:name>New Books Network</itunes:name>
      <itunes:email>marshallpoe@gmail.com</itunes:email>
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    <itunes:category text="Health &amp; Fitness">
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    <itunes:category text="Society &amp; Culture">
      <itunes:category text="Philosophy"/>
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      <itunes:category text="Books"/>
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    <item>
      <title>The New Modern Medicine: Disease, Evidence, and Epidemiological Medicine with Jonathan Fuller</title>
      <description>Jonathan Fuller’s&amp;nbsp;The New Modern Medicine: Disease, Evidence, and Epidemiological Medicine&amp;nbsp;(Oxford UP, 2025) takes the reader on a philosophical tour through scientific medicine, visiting its distinctive problems, particularly problems brought about by the twentieth century fusion of medicine with epidemiology. Drawing on the author’s training in philosophy of medicine, history and philosophy of science, and clinical medicine, the book examines the contours of the ‘epidemiological medicine’ that resulted from this fusion. It dissects several philosophical problems of the new modern medicine while exploring topics such as theories of contagion and cancer, concepts and theories of disease etiology, the nature of chronic diseases and mental disorders, concepts of medical risk, models of medical evidence and medical prediction, the problems of extrapolating from clinical research, therapeutic skepticism, and the future of modern medicine. Expansive, detailed, rigorous, insightful, and refreshingly penetrable,&amp;nbsp;The New Modern Medicine&amp;nbsp;is an ambitious contribution to the philosophy of medicine and to our understanding of scientific medicine. It is available&amp;nbsp;online open access.﻿

This episode is hosted by Alex Broadbent,&amp;nbsp;﻿Professor of Philosophy of Science at Durham University and Visiting Professor at the University of Johannesburg. He is Director of the Durham-Johannesburg&amp;nbsp;Centre for Philosophy of Epidemiology, Medicine, and Public Health, and co-leads the Measurement Lab in the&amp;nbsp;Institute for Medical Humanities.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 13 Aug 2026 08:00:00 -0000</pubDate>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:author>Marshall Poe</itunes:author>
      <itunes:subtitle></itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:summary>Jonathan Fuller’s&amp;nbsp;The New Modern Medicine: Disease, Evidence, and Epidemiological Medicine&amp;nbsp;(Oxford UP, 2025) takes the reader on a philosophical tour through scientific medicine, visiting its distinctive problems, particularly problems brought about by the twentieth century fusion of medicine with epidemiology. Drawing on the author’s training in philosophy of medicine, history and philosophy of science, and clinical medicine, the book examines the contours of the ‘epidemiological medicine’ that resulted from this fusion. It dissects several philosophical problems of the new modern medicine while exploring topics such as theories of contagion and cancer, concepts and theories of disease etiology, the nature of chronic diseases and mental disorders, concepts of medical risk, models of medical evidence and medical prediction, the problems of extrapolating from clinical research, therapeutic skepticism, and the future of modern medicine. Expansive, detailed, rigorous, insightful, and refreshingly penetrable,&amp;nbsp;The New Modern Medicine&amp;nbsp;is an ambitious contribution to the philosophy of medicine and to our understanding of scientific medicine. It is available&amp;nbsp;online open access.﻿

This episode is hosted by Alex Broadbent,&amp;nbsp;﻿Professor of Philosophy of Science at Durham University and Visiting Professor at the University of Johannesburg. He is Director of the Durham-Johannesburg&amp;nbsp;Centre for Philosophy of Epidemiology, Medicine, and Public Health, and co-leads the Measurement Lab in the&amp;nbsp;Institute for Medical Humanities.</itunes:summary>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p><a href="https://www.hps.pitt.edu/people/jonathan-fuller">Jonathan Fuller</a>’s&nbsp;<a href="https://bookshop.org/a/12343/9780190066147">The New Modern Medicine: Disease, Evidence, and Epidemiological Medicine</a>&nbsp;(Oxford UP, 2025) takes the reader on a philosophical tour through scientific medicine, visiting its distinctive problems, particularly problems brought about by the twentieth century fusion of medicine with epidemiology. Drawing on the author’s training in philosophy of medicine, history and philosophy of science, and clinical medicine, the book examines the contours of the ‘epidemiological medicine’ that resulted from this fusion. It dissects several philosophical problems of the new modern medicine while exploring topics such as theories of contagion and cancer, concepts and theories of disease etiology, the nature of chronic diseases and mental disorders, concepts of medical risk, models of medical evidence and medical prediction, the problems of extrapolating from clinical research, therapeutic skepticism, and the future of modern medicine. Expansive, detailed, rigorous, insightful, and refreshingly penetrable,&nbsp;<em>The New Modern Medicine</em>&nbsp;is an ambitious contribution to the philosophy of medicine and to our understanding of scientific medicine. It is available&nbsp;<a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-new-modern-medicine-9780190066147?cc=us&amp;lang=en&amp;">online open access</a>.﻿<br></p>
<p>This episode is hosted by Alex Broadbent,&nbsp;﻿Professor of Philosophy of Science at Durham University and Visiting Professor at the University of Johannesburg. He is Director of the Durham-Johannesburg&nbsp;<a href="https://www.durham.ac.uk/research/institutes-and-centres/philosophy-of-epidemiology-medicine-public-health/">Centre for Philosophy of Epidemiology, Medicine, and Public Health</a>, and co-leads the Measurement Lab in the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.durham.ac.uk/research/institutes-and-centres/medical-humanities/">Institute for Medical Humanities</a>.</p>]]>
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      <itunes:duration>2714</itunes:duration>
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      <title>Vanessa Rampton, "Making Medical Progress: History of a Contested Idea" (Cambridge UP, 2025)</title>
      <description>Answers to the question 'what is medical progress?' have always been contested, and any one response is always bound up with contextual ideas of personhood, society, and health. However, the widely held enthusiasm for medical progress escapes more general critiques of progress as a conceptual category.

From the intersection of intellectual history, philosophy, and the medical humanities, in&amp;nbsp;Making Medical Progress: History of a Contested Idea&amp;nbsp;(Cambridge UP, 2025) Dr. Vanessa Rampton sheds light on the politics of medical progress and how they have downplayed the tensions between individual and social goods. She examines how a shared consensus about its value gives medical progress vast political and economic capital, revealing who benefits, who is left out, and who is harmed by this narrative. From ancient Greece to artificial intelligence, exploring the origins and ethics of different visions of progress offers valuable insight into how we can make them more meaningful in future. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.

This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose&amp;nbsp;book&amp;nbsp;focuses on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. You can find Miranda’s interviews on&amp;nbsp;New Books with Miranda Melcher, wherever you get your podcasts.</description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 15 Feb 2026 09:00:00 -0000</pubDate>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:author>Marshall Poe</itunes:author>
      <itunes:subtitle></itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:summary>Answers to the question 'what is medical progress?' have always been contested, and any one response is always bound up with contextual ideas of personhood, society, and health. However, the widely held enthusiasm for medical progress escapes more general critiques of progress as a conceptual category.

From the intersection of intellectual history, philosophy, and the medical humanities, in&amp;nbsp;Making Medical Progress: History of a Contested Idea&amp;nbsp;(Cambridge UP, 2025) Dr. Vanessa Rampton sheds light on the politics of medical progress and how they have downplayed the tensions between individual and social goods. She examines how a shared consensus about its value gives medical progress vast political and economic capital, revealing who benefits, who is left out, and who is harmed by this narrative. From ancient Greece to artificial intelligence, exploring the origins and ethics of different visions of progress offers valuable insight into how we can make them more meaningful in future. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.

This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose&amp;nbsp;book&amp;nbsp;focuses on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. You can find Miranda’s interviews on&amp;nbsp;New Books with Miranda Melcher, wherever you get your podcasts.</itunes:summary>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p>Answers to the question 'what is medical progress?' have always been contested, and any one response is always bound up with contextual ideas of personhood, society, and health. However, the widely held enthusiasm for medical progress escapes more general critiques of progress as a conceptual category.</p>
<p>From the intersection of intellectual history, philosophy, and the medical humanities, in&nbsp;<a href="https://bookshop.org/a/12343/9781009602631">Making Medical Progress: History of a Contested Idea</a>&nbsp;(Cambridge UP, 2025) Dr. Vanessa Rampton sheds light on the politics of medical progress and how they have downplayed the tensions between individual and social goods. She examines how a shared consensus about its value gives medical progress vast political and economic capital, revealing who benefits, who is left out, and who is harmed by this narrative. From ancient Greece to artificial intelligence, exploring the origins and ethics of different visions of progress offers valuable insight into how we can make them more meaningful in future. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.</p>
<p><em>This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose</em><a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/securing-peace-in-angola-and-mozambique-9781350407930/"><em>&nbsp;book</em></a><em>&nbsp;focuses on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. You can find Miranda’s interviews on&nbsp;</em><a href="https://newbooksnetwork.com/category/special-series/new-books-with-miranda-melcher"><em>New Books with Miranda Melcher</em></a><em>, wherever you get your podcasts.</em></p>]]>
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      <itunes:duration>2046</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
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      <title>Şerife Tekin, "Reclaiming the Self in Psychiatry: Centering Personal Narrative for a Humanist Science" (Routledge, 2025)</title>
      <description>Psychiatry’s quest for credibility as a scientific discipline led it to adopt a disorder-label orientation in which mental conditions are categorized in terms of measurable behavioral criteria. In&amp;nbsp;Reclaiming the Self in Psychiatry: Centering personal narrative for a humanist science&amp;nbsp;(Routledge, 2025) Şerife Tekin offers an alternative framework that decenters the label and recenters the self. Tekin argues that how patients try to make sense of their experiences through self-narratives – including self-diagnosed labels – is an essential source of information for tailoring treatment. Tekin, who is associate professor of philosophy at State University of New York (SUNY) Upstate Medical University, proposes the Multitudinous Self (MuSe) model for integrating the patient’s self-perspective back into the psychiatric picture and helping psychiatry itself embrace a more sophisticated notion of scientific objectivity.


  
25EFLY2&amp;nbsp;valid&amp;nbsp;1st April 2025 - 30th September 2025


  
25EFLY3&amp;nbsp;valid&amp;nbsp;1st July 2025 - 31st December 2025</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Jun 2025 08:00:00 -0000</pubDate>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:author>Marshall Poe</itunes:author>
      <itunes:subtitle></itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:summary>Psychiatry’s quest for credibility as a scientific discipline led it to adopt a disorder-label orientation in which mental conditions are categorized in terms of measurable behavioral criteria. In&amp;nbsp;Reclaiming the Self in Psychiatry: Centering personal narrative for a humanist science&amp;nbsp;(Routledge, 2025) Şerife Tekin offers an alternative framework that decenters the label and recenters the self. Tekin argues that how patients try to make sense of their experiences through self-narratives – including self-diagnosed labels – is an essential source of information for tailoring treatment. Tekin, who is associate professor of philosophy at State University of New York (SUNY) Upstate Medical University, proposes the Multitudinous Self (MuSe) model for integrating the patient’s self-perspective back into the psychiatric picture and helping psychiatry itself embrace a more sophisticated notion of scientific objectivity.


  
25EFLY2&amp;nbsp;valid&amp;nbsp;1st April 2025 - 30th September 2025


  
25EFLY3&amp;nbsp;valid&amp;nbsp;1st July 2025 - 31st December 2025</itunes:summary>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p>Psychiatry’s quest for credibility as a scientific discipline led it to adopt a disorder-label orientation in which mental conditions are categorized in terms of measurable behavioral criteria. In&nbsp;<a href="https://bookshop.org/a/12343/9780367518110"><em>Reclaiming the Self in Psychiatry: Centering personal narrative for a humanist science</em>&nbsp;</a>(Routledge, 2025) Şerife Tekin offers an alternative framework that decenters the label and recenters the self. Tekin argues that how patients try to make sense of their experiences through self-narratives – including self-diagnosed labels – is an essential source of information for tailoring treatment. Tekin, who is associate professor of philosophy at State University of New York (SUNY) Upstate Medical University, proposes the Multitudinous Self (MuSe) model for integrating the patient’s self-perspective back into the psychiatric picture and helping psychiatry itself embrace a more sophisticated notion of scientific objectivity.</p>
<ul>
  <li>
<strong>25EFLY2&nbsp;</strong>valid&nbsp;<strong>1st April 2025 - 30th September 2025</strong>
</li>
  <li>
<strong>25EFLY3&nbsp;</strong>valid&nbsp;<strong>1st July 2025 - 31st December 2025</strong>
</li>
</ul>]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <itunes:duration>3814</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
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      <title>Anneli Jefferson, "Are Mental Disorders Brain Disorders?" (Routledge, 2024)</title>
      <description>The question of whether mental disorders are disorders of the brain has led to a long-running and controversial dispute within psychiatry, psychology and philosophy of mind and psychology. While recent work in neuroscience frequently tries to identify underlying brain dysfunction in mental disorders, detractors argue that labelling mental disorders as brain disorders is reductive and can result in harmful social effects.
Are Mental Disorders Brain Disorders?&amp;nbsp;(Routledge, 2024) brings a much-needed philosophical perspective to bear on this important question. Anneli Jefferson argues that while there is widespread agreement on paradigmatic cases of brain disorder such as brain cancer, Parkinson's or Alzheimer’s dementia, there is far less clarity on what the general, defining characteristics of brain disorders are. She identifies influential notions of brain disorder and shows why these are problematic. On her own, alternative, account, what counts as dysfunctional at the level of the brain frequently depends on what counts as dysfunctional at the psychological level. On this notion of brain disorder, she argues, many of the consequences people often associate with the brain disorder label do not follow. She also explores the important practical question of how to deal with the fact that many people do draw unlicensed inferences about treatment, personal responsibility or etiology from the information that a condition is a brain disorder or involves brain dysfunction.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 04 Nov 2024 09:00:00 -0000</pubDate>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>226</itunes:episode>
      <itunes:author>Marshall Poe</itunes:author>
      <itunes:subtitle>An interview with Anneli Jefferson</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:summary>The question of whether mental disorders are disorders of the brain has led to a long-running and controversial dispute within psychiatry, psychology and philosophy of mind and psychology. While recent work in neuroscience frequently tries to identify underlying brain dysfunction in mental disorders, detractors argue that labelling mental disorders as brain disorders is reductive and can result in harmful social effects.
Are Mental Disorders Brain Disorders?&amp;nbsp;(Routledge, 2024) brings a much-needed philosophical perspective to bear on this important question. Anneli Jefferson argues that while there is widespread agreement on paradigmatic cases of brain disorder such as brain cancer, Parkinson's or Alzheimer’s dementia, there is far less clarity on what the general, defining characteristics of brain disorders are. She identifies influential notions of brain disorder and shows why these are problematic. On her own, alternative, account, what counts as dysfunctional at the level of the brain frequently depends on what counts as dysfunctional at the psychological level. On this notion of brain disorder, she argues, many of the consequences people often associate with the brain disorder label do not follow. She also explores the important practical question of how to deal with the fact that many people do draw unlicensed inferences about treatment, personal responsibility or etiology from the information that a condition is a brain disorder or involves brain dysfunction.</itunes:summary>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p>The question of whether mental disorders are disorders of the brain has led to a long-running and controversial dispute within psychiatry, psychology and philosophy of mind and psychology. While recent work in neuroscience frequently tries to identify underlying brain dysfunction in mental disorders, detractors argue that labelling mental disorders as brain disorders is reductive and can result in harmful social effects.</p><p><a href="https://bookshop.org/a/12343/9781032306322"><em>Are Mental Disorders Brain Disorders?</em></a>&nbsp;(Routledge, 2024) brings a much-needed philosophical perspective to bear on this important question. Anneli Jefferson argues that while there is widespread agreement on paradigmatic cases of brain disorder such as brain cancer, Parkinson's or Alzheimer’s dementia, there is far less clarity on what the general, defining characteristics of brain disorders are. She identifies influential notions of brain disorder and shows why these are problematic. On her own, alternative, account, what counts as dysfunctional at the level of the brain frequently depends on what counts as dysfunctional at the psychological level. On this notion of brain disorder, she argues, many of the consequences people often associate with the brain disorder label do not follow. She also explores the important practical question of how to deal with the fact that many people do draw unlicensed inferences about treatment, personal responsibility or etiology from the information that a condition is a brain disorder or involves brain dysfunction.</p>]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <itunes:duration>5137</itunes:duration>
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      <title>Joel Michael Reynolds, "The Life Worth Living: Disability, Pain, and Morality" (U Minnesota Press, 2022)</title>
      <description>The Life Worth Living: Disability, Pain, and Morality&amp;nbsp;(U Minnesota Press, 2022) investigates the exclusion of and discrimination against disabled people across the history of Western moral philosophy. Building on decades of activism and scholarship, Joel Michael Reynolds shows how longstanding views of disability are misguided and unjust, and he lays out a vision of what an anti-ableist moral future requires.
More than 2,000 years ago, Aristotle said: "let there be a law that no deformed child shall live." This idea is alive and well today. During the past century, Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. argued that the United States can forcibly sterilize intellectually disabled women and philosopher Peter Singer argued for the right of parents to euthanize certain cognitively disabled infants.&amp;nbsp;The Life Worth Living&amp;nbsp;explores how and why such arguments persist by investigating the exclusion of and discrimination against disabled people across the history of Western moral philosophy.
Joel Michael Reynolds argues that this history demonstrates a fundamental mischaracterization of the meaning of disability, thanks to the conflation of lived experiences of disability with those of pain and suffering. Building on decades of activism and scholarship in the field, Reynolds shows how longstanding views of disability are misguided and unjust, and he lays out a vision of what an anti-ableist moral future requires.
The Life Worth Living&amp;nbsp;is the first sustained examination of disability through the lens of the history of moral philosophy and phenomenology, and it demonstrates how lived experiences of disability demand a far richer account of human flourishing, embodiment, community, and politics in philosophical inquiry and beyond.
Joel Michael Reynolds is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Disability Studies at Georgetown University, Senior Research Scholar in the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Senior Bioethics Advisor to The Hastings Center, Faculty Scholar of The Greenwall Foundation, and core faculty in Georgetown’s Disability Studies Program. He is the founder of&amp;nbsp;The Journal of Philosophy of Disability&amp;nbsp;and co-founder of&amp;nbsp;Oxford Studies in Disability, Ethics, and Society&amp;nbsp;from Oxford University Press.
Dr. Reynolds’ work explores the relationship between bodies, values, and society. He is especially concerned with the meaning of disability, the issue of ableism, and how philosophical inquiry into each might improve the lives of people with disabilities and the justness of institutions ranging from medicine to politics. These concerns lead to research across a range of traditions and specialties, including philosophy of disability, applied ethics (especially biomedical ethics, public health ethics, tech/data ethics, and ELSI research in genomics), 20th c. European and American philosophy (with an emphasis on phenomenology and pragmatism as practiced in connection with the history of philosophy), and social epistemology (particularly issues of epistemic injustice as linked to social ontology).
﻿Autumn Wilke&amp;nbsp;works in higher education as an ADA coordinator and diversity officer and is also an author and doctoral candidate with research/topics related to disability and higher education.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 09 Sep 2022 08:00:00 -0000</pubDate>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>5</itunes:episode>
      <itunes:author>Marshall Poe</itunes:author>
      <itunes:subtitle>An interview with Joel Michael Reynolds</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:summary>The Life Worth Living: Disability, Pain, and Morality&amp;nbsp;(U Minnesota Press, 2022) investigates the exclusion of and discrimination against disabled people across the history of Western moral philosophy. Building on decades of activism and scholarship, Joel Michael Reynolds shows how longstanding views of disability are misguided and unjust, and he lays out a vision of what an anti-ableist moral future requires.
More than 2,000 years ago, Aristotle said: "let there be a law that no deformed child shall live." This idea is alive and well today. During the past century, Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. argued that the United States can forcibly sterilize intellectually disabled women and philosopher Peter Singer argued for the right of parents to euthanize certain cognitively disabled infants.&amp;nbsp;The Life Worth Living&amp;nbsp;explores how and why such arguments persist by investigating the exclusion of and discrimination against disabled people across the history of Western moral philosophy.
Joel Michael Reynolds argues that this history demonstrates a fundamental mischaracterization of the meaning of disability, thanks to the conflation of lived experiences of disability with those of pain and suffering. Building on decades of activism and scholarship in the field, Reynolds shows how longstanding views of disability are misguided and unjust, and he lays out a vision of what an anti-ableist moral future requires.
The Life Worth Living&amp;nbsp;is the first sustained examination of disability through the lens of the history of moral philosophy and phenomenology, and it demonstrates how lived experiences of disability demand a far richer account of human flourishing, embodiment, community, and politics in philosophical inquiry and beyond.
Joel Michael Reynolds is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Disability Studies at Georgetown University, Senior Research Scholar in the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Senior Bioethics Advisor to The Hastings Center, Faculty Scholar of The Greenwall Foundation, and core faculty in Georgetown’s Disability Studies Program. He is the founder of&amp;nbsp;The Journal of Philosophy of Disability&amp;nbsp;and co-founder of&amp;nbsp;Oxford Studies in Disability, Ethics, and Society&amp;nbsp;from Oxford University Press.
Dr. Reynolds’ work explores the relationship between bodies, values, and society. He is especially concerned with the meaning of disability, the issue of ableism, and how philosophical inquiry into each might improve the lives of people with disabilities and the justness of institutions ranging from medicine to politics. These concerns lead to research across a range of traditions and specialties, including philosophy of disability, applied ethics (especially biomedical ethics, public health ethics, tech/data ethics, and ELSI research in genomics), 20th c. European and American philosophy (with an emphasis on phenomenology and pragmatism as practiced in connection with the history of philosophy), and social epistemology (particularly issues of epistemic injustice as linked to social ontology).
﻿Autumn Wilke&amp;nbsp;works in higher education as an ADA coordinator and diversity officer and is also an author and doctoral candidate with research/topics related to disability and higher education.</itunes:summary>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p><a href="https://bookshop.org/a/12343/9781517907785"><em>The Life Worth Living: Disability, Pain, and Morality</em></a><em>&nbsp;</em>(U Minnesota Press, 2022) investigates the exclusion of and discrimination against disabled people across the history of Western moral philosophy. Building on decades of activism and scholarship, Joel Michael Reynolds shows how longstanding views of disability are misguided and unjust, and he lays out a vision of what an anti-ableist moral future requires.</p><p>More than 2,000 years ago, Aristotle said: "let there be a law that no deformed child shall live." This idea is alive and well today. During the past century, Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. argued that the United States can forcibly sterilize intellectually disabled women and philosopher Peter Singer argued for the right of parents to euthanize certain cognitively disabled infants.&nbsp;<em>The Life Worth Living</em>&nbsp;explores how and why such arguments persist by investigating the exclusion of and discrimination against disabled people across the history of Western moral philosophy.</p><p>Joel Michael Reynolds argues that this history demonstrates a fundamental mischaracterization of the meaning of disability, thanks to the conflation of lived experiences of disability with those of pain and suffering. Building on decades of activism and scholarship in the field, Reynolds shows how longstanding views of disability are misguided and unjust, and he lays out a vision of what an anti-ableist moral future requires.</p><p><em>The Life Worth Living</em>&nbsp;is the first sustained examination of disability through the lens of the history of moral philosophy and phenomenology, and it demonstrates how lived experiences of disability demand a far richer account of human flourishing, embodiment, community, and politics in philosophical inquiry and beyond.</p><p>Joel Michael Reynolds is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Disability Studies at Georgetown University, Senior Research Scholar in the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Senior Bioethics Advisor to The Hastings Center, Faculty Scholar of The Greenwall Foundation, and core faculty in Georgetown’s Disability Studies Program. He is the founder of&nbsp;<em>The Journal of Philosophy of Disability</em>&nbsp;and co-founder of&nbsp;<em>Oxford Studies in Disability, Ethics, and Society</em>&nbsp;from Oxford University Press.</p><p>Dr. Reynolds’ work explores the relationship between bodies, values, and society. He is especially concerned with the meaning of disability, the issue of ableism, and how philosophical inquiry into each might improve the lives of people with disabilities and the justness of institutions ranging from medicine to politics. These concerns lead to research across a range of traditions and specialties, including philosophy of disability, applied ethics (especially biomedical ethics, public health ethics, tech/data ethics, and ELSI research in genomics), 20th c. European and American philosophy (with an emphasis on phenomenology and pragmatism as practiced in connection with the history of philosophy), and social epistemology (particularly issues of epistemic injustice as linked to social ontology).</p><p><em>﻿</em><a href="https://www.grinnell.edu/user/wilkeaut"><em>Autumn Wilke</em></a><em>&nbsp;works in higher education as an ADA coordinator and diversity officer and is also an author and doctoral candidate with research/topics related to disability and higher education.</em></p>]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <itunes:duration>2666</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
      <guid isPermaLink="false"><![CDATA[09de2618-91c8-11f1-a0cb-c7a12b8cec12]]></guid>
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    <item>
      <title>The Future of Delusions: A Discussion with Lisa Bortolotti</title>
      <description>The accusation “you’re deluded” is often used as something of a cheap shot intended to silence an opponent in debate. But what is the nature of a delusion and how can we assess rationality and irrationality? In this podcast, Owen Bennett-Jones talks to Professor Lisa Bortolotti who studies the philosophy of psychology and psychiatry at Birmingham University and is the author of among many other things,&amp;nbsp;Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs&amp;nbsp;(Oxford UP, 2010)&amp;nbsp;and most recently edited&amp;nbsp;Delusions in Context&amp;nbsp;(Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
Owen Bennett-Jones&amp;nbsp;is a freelance journalist and writer. A former BBC correspondent and presenter he has been a resident foreign correspondent in Bucharest, Geneva, Islamabad, Hanoi and Beirut. He is recently wrote a history of the Bhutto dynasty which was published by Yale University Press.</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 05 Apr 2022 08:00:00 -0000</pubDate>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>5</itunes:episode>
      <itunes:author>Marshall Poe</itunes:author>
      <itunes:subtitle>An interview with Lisa Bortolotti</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:summary>The accusation “you’re deluded” is often used as something of a cheap shot intended to silence an opponent in debate. But what is the nature of a delusion and how can we assess rationality and irrationality? In this podcast, Owen Bennett-Jones talks to Professor Lisa Bortolotti who studies the philosophy of psychology and psychiatry at Birmingham University and is the author of among many other things,&amp;nbsp;Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs&amp;nbsp;(Oxford UP, 2010)&amp;nbsp;and most recently edited&amp;nbsp;Delusions in Context&amp;nbsp;(Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
Owen Bennett-Jones&amp;nbsp;is a freelance journalist and writer. A former BBC correspondent and presenter he has been a resident foreign correspondent in Bucharest, Geneva, Islamabad, Hanoi and Beirut. He is recently wrote a history of the Bhutto dynasty which was published by Yale University Press.</itunes:summary>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p>The accusation “you’re deluded” is often used as something of a cheap shot intended to silence an opponent in debate. But what is the nature of a delusion and how can we assess rationality and irrationality? In this podcast, Owen Bennett-Jones talks to Professor Lisa Bortolotti who studies the philosophy of psychology and psychiatry at Birmingham University and is the author of among many other things,&nbsp;<a href="https://bookshop.org/a/12343/9780199206162"><em>Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs</em></a><em>&nbsp;</em>(Oxford UP, 2010)&nbsp;and most recently edited&nbsp;<a href="https://bookshop.org/a/12343/9783319972015"><em>Delusions in Context</em></a>&nbsp;(Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).</p><p><a href="https://owenbennettjones.com/about/"><em>Owen Bennett-Jones</em></a><em>&nbsp;is a freelance journalist and writer. A former BBC correspondent and presenter he has been a resident foreign correspondent in Bucharest, Geneva, Islamabad, Hanoi and Beirut. He is recently wrote a history of the Bhutto dynasty which was published by Yale University Press.</em></p>]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <itunes:duration>2981</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
      <guid isPermaLink="false"><![CDATA[183a1ed8-91c8-11f1-9c60-774533dfd37b]]></guid>
      <enclosure url="https://traffic.megaphone.fm/NBNK9830955975.mp3?updated=1640716098" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/>
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    <item>
      <title>Daniel Groll, "Conceiving People: Genetic Knowledge and the Ethics of Sperm and Egg Donation" (Oxford UP, 2021)</title>
      <description>In the United States, tens of thousands of children are conceived every year with donated gametes. When people decide to create a child with donated gametes, they’ll typically have to make a moral decision about whether the&amp;nbsp;identity&amp;nbsp;of the donor will be available to the resulting person. This quickly raises additional moral and even existential questions about the value of&amp;nbsp;knowing&amp;nbsp;about the circumstances of our own conception.
In&amp;nbsp;Conceiving People: Genetic Knowledge and the Ethics of Sperm and Egg Donation&amp;nbsp;(Oxford UP, 2021)&amp;nbsp;Daniel Groll&amp;nbsp;argues that because donor-conceived persons are likely to develop a significant and worthwhile interest in knowing the identity of their genetic progenitor, their intended parents have an obligation to use a non-anonymous donor.
Robert Talisse&amp;nbsp;is the W. Alton Jones Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University.</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Feb 2022 09:00:00 -0000</pubDate>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>273</itunes:episode>
      <itunes:author>Marshall Poe</itunes:author>
      <itunes:subtitle>An interview with Daniel Groll</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:summary>In the United States, tens of thousands of children are conceived every year with donated gametes. When people decide to create a child with donated gametes, they’ll typically have to make a moral decision about whether the&amp;nbsp;identity&amp;nbsp;of the donor will be available to the resulting person. This quickly raises additional moral and even existential questions about the value of&amp;nbsp;knowing&amp;nbsp;about the circumstances of our own conception.
In&amp;nbsp;Conceiving People: Genetic Knowledge and the Ethics of Sperm and Egg Donation&amp;nbsp;(Oxford UP, 2021)&amp;nbsp;Daniel Groll&amp;nbsp;argues that because donor-conceived persons are likely to develop a significant and worthwhile interest in knowing the identity of their genetic progenitor, their intended parents have an obligation to use a non-anonymous donor.
Robert Talisse&amp;nbsp;is the W. Alton Jones Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University.</itunes:summary>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p>In the United States, tens of thousands of children are conceived every year with donated gametes. When people decide to create a child with donated gametes, they’ll typically have to make a moral decision about whether the&nbsp;<em>identity&nbsp;</em>of the donor will be available to the resulting person. This quickly raises additional moral and even existential questions about the value of&nbsp;<em>knowing&nbsp;</em>about the circumstances of our own conception.</p><p>In&nbsp;<a href="https://bookshop.org/a/12343/9780190063054"><em>Conceiving People: Genetic Knowledge and the Ethics of Sperm and Egg Donation</em></a>&nbsp;(Oxford UP, 2021)&nbsp;<a href="https://www.carleton.edu/people/dgroll/">Daniel Groll</a>&nbsp;argues that because donor-conceived persons are likely to develop a significant and worthwhile interest in knowing the identity of their genetic progenitor, their intended parents have an obligation to use a non-anonymous donor.</p><p><a href="https://as.vanderbilt.edu/philosophy/bio/robertb-talisse"><em>Robert Talisse</em></a><em>&nbsp;is the W. Alton Jones Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University.</em></p>]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <itunes:duration>3864</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
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      <enclosure url="https://traffic.megaphone.fm/NBNK1405463330.mp3?updated=1643221906" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/>
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    <item>
      <title>Philosophy of Medicine on COVID-19</title>
      <link>https://jonathanfuller.ca/podcast/2021/8/28/philosophy-of-medicine-on-covid-19</link>
      <description>During the COVID-19 pandemic, scientists and policymakers have responded with unprecedented solutions. The pandemic has also forced a rethinking of science, public health and their relationship to the public. How can philosophy of medicine help us respond to the fundamentally philosophical problems that this rethinking involves?
In May of 2021, I hosted a panel discussion with experts in health science, public health and philosophy titled Philosophy of Medicine on COVID-19. We talked about normal science and fast science; modeling and evidence in public health; science, uncertainty and decision-making; expertise and science communication; and the relationship between public health and the publics. 
In today’s consultation, we revisit that conversation with Trisha Greenhalgh (University of Oxford), Ross Upshur (University of Toronto), Alex Broadbent (University of Johannesburg), Maya Goldenberg (University of Guelph), and Sang-Wook Yi (Hanyang University).

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Philosophy of Medicine on COVID-19</description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 28 Aug 2021 19:47:00 -0000</pubDate>
      <itunes:title>Philosophy of Medicine on COVID-19</itunes:title>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:author>Marshall Poe</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://megaphone.imgix.net/podcasts/e4e75650-9b71-11f1-97cc-c7e26d75a85f/image/9e818cf738eb3f5413c5f82b9ff7dd5b.png?ixlib=rails-4.3.1&amp;max-w=3000&amp;max-h=3000&amp;fit=crop&amp;auto=format,compress"/>
      <itunes:subtitle>During the COVID-19 pandemic, scientists and policymakers have responded with unprecedented solutions. The pandemic has also forced a rethinking of science, public health and their relationship to the public. How can philosophy of medicine help us respond to the fundamentally philosophical problems that this rethinking involves?

In May of 2021, I hosted a panel discussion with experts in health science, public health and philosophy titled Philosophy of Medicine on COVID-19. We talked about normal science and fast science; modeling and evidence in public health; science, uncertainty and decision-making; expertise and science communication; and the relationship between public health and the publics. 

In today’s consultation, we revisit that conversation with Trisha Greenhalgh (University of Oxford), Ross Upshur (University of Toronto), Alex Broadbent (University of Johannesburg), Maya Goldenberg (University of Guelph), and Sang-Wook Yi (Hanyang University).</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:summary>During the COVID-19 pandemic, scientists and policymakers have responded with unprecedented solutions. The pandemic has also forced a rethinking of science, public health and their relationship to the public. How can philosophy of medicine help us respond to the fundamentally philosophical problems that this rethinking involves?
In May of 2021, I hosted a panel discussion with experts in health science, public health and philosophy titled Philosophy of Medicine on COVID-19. We talked about normal science and fast science; modeling and evidence in public health; science, uncertainty and decision-making; expertise and science communication; and the relationship between public health and the publics. 
In today’s consultation, we revisit that conversation with Trisha Greenhalgh (University of Oxford), Ross Upshur (University of Toronto), Alex Broadbent (University of Johannesburg), Maya Goldenberg (University of Guelph), and Sang-Wook Yi (Hanyang University).

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Philosophy of Medicine on COVID-19</itunes:summary>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p class="">During the COVID-19 pandemic, scientists and policymakers have responded with unprecedented solutions. The pandemic has also forced a rethinking of science, public health and their relationship to the public. How can philosophy of medicine help us respond to the fundamentally philosophical problems that this rethinking involves?</p><p class="">In May of 2021, I hosted a panel discussion with experts in health science, public health and philosophy titled Philosophy of Medicine on COVID-19. We talked about normal science and fast science; modeling and evidence in public health; science, uncertainty and decision-making; expertise and science communication; and the relationship between public health and the publics. </p><p class="">In today’s consultation, we revisit that conversation with Trisha Greenhalgh (University of Oxford), Ross Upshur (University of Toronto), Alex Broadbent (University of Johannesburg), Maya Goldenberg (University of Guelph), and Sang-Wook Yi (Hanyang University).</p>
























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Philosophy of Medicine on COVID-19
          
          
        
        
          
            
            ]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <itunes:duration>2926</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
      <guid isPermaLink="false"><![CDATA[5ba53943c2ff61461b6956f4:5c35071f575d1f59c2a25537:612a90b461a676151862a556]]></guid>
      <enclosure url="https://traffic.megaphone.fm/NBNK9727386691.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/>
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    <item>
      <title>Thomas Pradeu, "Philosophy of Immunology" (Cambridge UP, 2020)</title>
      <description>Vaccines make us wholly or partly immune to disease, such as Covid-19. But what is it to be immune? What is an immune system, and what does it do? In its beginnings, immunology was considered the science of the self/non-self distinction: the immune system comprised the self’s defenses against invading non-self pathogens, and was a sophisticated system possessed only by vertebrates. In&amp;nbsp;Philosophy of Immunology&amp;nbsp;(Cambridge University Press, 2020), Thomas Pradeu explains why these traditional conceptions have been upended over the past 20 years or so. It is now accepted that even single celled organisms have immune systems and that immune systems are also active in many biological activities, including regulation of foreign entities that are not part of the body but are not pathogens either, such as the gut microbiome. Pradeu, who is senior researcher at CNRS and University of Bordeau, defends his view of the individual as an immunologically unified chimera, and speculates about the implications for our understanding of cognition and psychiatric illness in the light of new discoveries of overlap between the immune and nervous systems.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 10 Feb 2021 09:00:00 -0000</pubDate>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>241</itunes:episode>
      <itunes:author>Marshall Poe</itunes:author>
      <itunes:subtitle>Interview with Thomas Pradeu</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:summary>Vaccines make us wholly or partly immune to disease, such as Covid-19. But what is it to be immune? What is an immune system, and what does it do? In its beginnings, immunology was considered the science of the self/non-self distinction: the immune system comprised the self’s defenses against invading non-self pathogens, and was a sophisticated system possessed only by vertebrates. In&amp;nbsp;Philosophy of Immunology&amp;nbsp;(Cambridge University Press, 2020), Thomas Pradeu explains why these traditional conceptions have been upended over the past 20 years or so. It is now accepted that even single celled organisms have immune systems and that immune systems are also active in many biological activities, including regulation of foreign entities that are not part of the body but are not pathogens either, such as the gut microbiome. Pradeu, who is senior researcher at CNRS and University of Bordeau, defends his view of the individual as an immunologically unified chimera, and speculates about the implications for our understanding of cognition and psychiatric illness in the light of new discoveries of overlap between the immune and nervous systems.</itunes:summary>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p>Vaccines make us wholly or partly immune to disease, such as Covid-19. But what is it to be immune? What is an immune system, and what does it do? In its beginnings, immunology was considered the science of the self/non-self distinction: the immune system comprised the self’s defenses against invading non-self pathogens, and was a sophisticated system possessed only by vertebrates. In&nbsp;<a href="https://bookshop.org/a/12343/9781108727501"><em>Philosophy of Immunology</em></a>&nbsp;(Cambridge University Press, 2020), Thomas Pradeu explains why these traditional conceptions have been upended over the past 20 years or so. It is now accepted that even single celled organisms have immune systems and that immune systems are also active in many biological activities, including regulation of foreign entities that are not part of the body but are not pathogens either, such as the gut microbiome. Pradeu, who is senior researcher at CNRS and University of Bordeau, defends his view of the individual as an immunologically unified chimera, and speculates about the implications for our understanding of cognition and psychiatric illness in the light of new discoveries of overlap between the immune and nervous systems.</p>]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <itunes:duration>3848</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
      <guid isPermaLink="false"><![CDATA[3e53c70e-91c8-11f1-aa20-d33e977600f6]]></guid>
      <enclosure url="https://traffic.megaphone.fm/NBNK7399743929.mp3?updated=1612814522" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/>
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    <item>
      <title>Nicole Hassoun, "Global Health Impact: Expanding Access to Essential Medicines" (Oxford UP, 2020)</title>
      <description>Every year nine million people are diagnosed with tuberculosis, every day over 13,400 people are infected with AIDs, and every thirty seconds malaria kills a child. For most of the world, critical medications that treat these deadly diseases are scarce, costly, and growing obsolete, as access to first-line drugs remains out of reach and resistance rates rise. Rather than focusing research and development on creating affordable medicines for these deadly global diseases, pharmaceutical companies instead invest in commercially lucrative products for more affluent customers.
Nicole Hassoun argues that everyone has a human right to health and to access to essential medicines, and she proposes the Global Health Impact (global-health-impact.org/new) system as a means to guarantee those rights. Her proposal directly addresses the pharmaceutical industry's role: it rates pharmaceutical companies based on their medicines' impact on improving global health, rewarding highly-rated medicines with a Global Health Impact label.
Global Health Impact: Expanding Access to Essential Medicines (Oxford University Press, 2020) has three parts. The first makes the case for a human right to health and specifically access to essential medicines. Hassoun defends the argument against recent criticism of these proposed rights. The second section develops the Global Health Impact proposal in detail. The final section explores the proposal's potential applications and effects, considering the empirical evidence that supports it and comparing it to similar ethical labels. Through a thoughtful and interdisciplinary approach to creating new labeling, investment, and licensing strategies, Global Health Impact&amp;nbsp;demands an unwavering commitment to global justice and corporate responsibility.
Nicole Hassoun&amp;nbsp;is Professor of Philosophy at Binghamton University and Visiting Scholar at Cornell University.
Claire Clark is a medical educator, historian of medicine, and associate professor in the University of Kentucky’s College of Medicine. She teaches and writes about health behavior in historical context.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 31 Aug 2020 08:00:00 -0000</pubDate>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>85</itunes:episode>
      <itunes:author>Marshall Poe</itunes:author>
      <itunes:subtitle>Every year nine million people are diagnosed with tuberculosis, every day over 13,400 people are infected with AIDs, and every thirty seconds malaria kills a child...</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:summary>Every year nine million people are diagnosed with tuberculosis, every day over 13,400 people are infected with AIDs, and every thirty seconds malaria kills a child. For most of the world, critical medications that treat these deadly diseases are scarce, costly, and growing obsolete, as access to first-line drugs remains out of reach and resistance rates rise. Rather than focusing research and development on creating affordable medicines for these deadly global diseases, pharmaceutical companies instead invest in commercially lucrative products for more affluent customers.
Nicole Hassoun argues that everyone has a human right to health and to access to essential medicines, and she proposes the Global Health Impact (global-health-impact.org/new) system as a means to guarantee those rights. Her proposal directly addresses the pharmaceutical industry's role: it rates pharmaceutical companies based on their medicines' impact on improving global health, rewarding highly-rated medicines with a Global Health Impact label.
Global Health Impact: Expanding Access to Essential Medicines (Oxford University Press, 2020) has three parts. The first makes the case for a human right to health and specifically access to essential medicines. Hassoun defends the argument against recent criticism of these proposed rights. The second section develops the Global Health Impact proposal in detail. The final section explores the proposal's potential applications and effects, considering the empirical evidence that supports it and comparing it to similar ethical labels. Through a thoughtful and interdisciplinary approach to creating new labeling, investment, and licensing strategies, Global Health Impact&amp;nbsp;demands an unwavering commitment to global justice and corporate responsibility.
Nicole Hassoun&amp;nbsp;is Professor of Philosophy at Binghamton University and Visiting Scholar at Cornell University.
Claire Clark is a medical educator, historian of medicine, and associate professor in the University of Kentucky’s College of Medicine. She teaches and writes about health behavior in historical context.</itunes:summary>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p>Every year nine million people are diagnosed with tuberculosis, every day over 13,400 people are infected with AIDs, and every thirty seconds malaria kills a child. For most of the world, critical medications that treat these deadly diseases are scarce, costly, and growing obsolete, as access to first-line drugs remains out of reach and resistance rates rise. Rather than focusing research and development on creating affordable medicines for these deadly global diseases, pharmaceutical companies instead invest in commercially lucrative products for more affluent customers.</p><p>Nicole Hassoun argues that everyone has a human right to health and to access to essential medicines, and she proposes the Global Health Impact (global-health-impact.org/new) system as a means to guarantee those rights. Her proposal directly addresses the pharmaceutical industry's role: it rates pharmaceutical companies based on their medicines' impact on improving global health, rewarding highly-rated medicines with a Global Health Impact label.</p><p><a href="https://bookshop.org/a/12343/9780197514993"><em>Global Health Impact: Expanding Access to Essential Medicines</em></a> (Oxford University Press, 2020) has three parts. The first makes the case for a human right to health and specifically access to essential medicines. Hassoun defends the argument against recent criticism of these proposed rights. The second section develops the Global Health Impact proposal in detail. The final section explores the proposal's potential applications and effects, considering the empirical evidence that supports it and comparing it to similar ethical labels. Through a thoughtful and interdisciplinary approach to creating new labeling, investment, and licensing strategies, <em>Global Health Impact&nbsp;</em>demands an unwavering commitment to global justice and corporate responsibility.</p><p>Nicole Hassoun&nbsp;is Professor of Philosophy at Binghamton University and Visiting Scholar at Cornell University.</p><p><a href="https://www.clairedclark.com/">Claire Clark</a> <em>is a medical educator, historian of medicine, and associate professor in the University of Kentucky’s College of Medicine. She teaches and writes about health behavior in historical context.</em></p>]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <itunes:duration>2346</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
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    <item>
      <title>Race in Epidemiology and Medicine with Sean Valles</title>
      <link>https://jonathanfuller.ca/podcast/2020/7/5/sean-valles-race-in-epidemiology-and-medicine</link>
      <description>&amp;nbsp;


  There is renewed research and attention to race in epidemiology and medicine, partly owing to developments in population genetics. Yet race is a contested category and poses philosophical questions about the reality of racial categories as well as the ethical and social-political implications of using them. For instance, is race a social construction; and if so, how do racial categories line up with the world? Perhaps more pressingly, should we be using racial categories in epidemiology and medicine in the first place?
Today’s consultation is with philosopher Sean Valles, Associate Professor at Michigan State University. 

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Race in epidemiology and medicine
          
          with Sean Valles</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2020 02:37:00 -0000</pubDate>
      <itunes:title>Race in epidemiology and medicine</itunes:title>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:author>Marshall Poe</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://megaphone.imgix.net/podcasts/db229bca-9b71-11f1-93ca-eb61eabf7b5b/image/6c43631ca1e9b359bd203b9b964f5822.png?ixlib=rails-4.3.1&amp;max-w=3000&amp;max-h=3000&amp;fit=crop&amp;auto=format,compress"/>
      <itunes:subtitle>with Sean Valles</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:summary>&amp;nbsp;


  There is renewed research and attention to race in epidemiology and medicine, partly owing to developments in population genetics. Yet race is a contested category and poses philosophical questions about the reality of racial categories as well as the ethical and social-political implications of using them. For instance, is race a social construction; and if so, how do racial categories line up with the world? Perhaps more pressingly, should we be using racial categories in epidemiology and medicine in the first place?
Today’s consultation is with philosopher Sean Valles, Associate Professor at Michigan State University. 

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Race in epidemiology and medicine
          
          with Sean Valles</itunes:summary>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[&nbsp;


  <p class="">There is renewed research and attention to race in epidemiology and medicine, partly owing to developments in population genetics. Yet race is a contested category and poses philosophical questions about the reality of racial categories as well as the ethical and social-political implications of using them. For instance, is race a social construction; and if so, how do racial categories line up with the world? Perhaps more pressingly, should we be using racial categories in epidemiology and medicine in the first place?</p><p class="">Today’s consultation is with philosopher Sean Valles, Associate Professor at Michigan State University. </p>
























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Race in epidemiology and medicine
          
          with Sean Valles
        
        
          
            
            ]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <itunes:duration>1006</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
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    <item>
      <title>Jacob Stegenga on Medical Nihilism</title>
      <link>https://jonathanfuller.ca/podcast/2020/5/31/jacob-stegenga-medical-nihilism</link>
      <description>Medical Nihilism. Is it a vestige of a bygone age in medicine beset with treatments like mercury and bloodletting? Or the proper conclusion of a line of argument about our current medical interventions citing problems with contemporary medical research? These problems include the complex pathophysiology of contemporary diseases, the malleability of medical research methods, the biased social nexus of medical research, and a small effect size crisis. Should we have low confidence on average in medical interventions today? And is this the kind of question that we can answer with a dose of data and philosophy?
Today’s consultation is with philosopher Jacob Stegenga, Reader in History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Cambridge.
You can read the article that Stegenga wrote to accompany this episode, “Gentle medicine could radically transform medical practice”, in Aeon.

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Medical Nihilism
          
          with Jacob Stegenga</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2020 01:26:00 -0000</pubDate>
      <itunes:title>Medical Nihilism</itunes:title>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:author>Marshall Poe</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://megaphone.imgix.net/podcasts/cb917122-9b71-11f1-b23f-5797090b5e7c/image/6c43631ca1e9b359bd203b9b964f5822.png?ixlib=rails-4.3.1&amp;max-w=3000&amp;max-h=3000&amp;fit=crop&amp;auto=format,compress"/>
      <itunes:subtitle>with Jacob Stegenga</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:summary>Medical Nihilism. Is it a vestige of a bygone age in medicine beset with treatments like mercury and bloodletting? Or the proper conclusion of a line of argument about our current medical interventions citing problems with contemporary medical research? These problems include the complex pathophysiology of contemporary diseases, the malleability of medical research methods, the biased social nexus of medical research, and a small effect size crisis. Should we have low confidence on average in medical interventions today? And is this the kind of question that we can answer with a dose of data and philosophy?
Today’s consultation is with philosopher Jacob Stegenga, Reader in History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Cambridge.
You can read the article that Stegenga wrote to accompany this episode, “Gentle medicine could radically transform medical practice”, in Aeon.

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Medical Nihilism
          
          with Jacob Stegenga</itunes:summary>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p class="">  </p><p class="">Medical Nihilism. Is it a vestige of a bygone age in medicine beset with treatments like mercury and bloodletting? Or the proper conclusion of a line of argument about our current medical interventions citing problems with contemporary medical research? These problems include the complex pathophysiology of contemporary diseases, the malleability of medical research methods, the biased social nexus of medical research, and a small effect size crisis. Should we have low confidence on average in medical interventions today? And is this the kind of question that we can answer with a dose of data and philosophy?</p><p class="">Today’s consultation is with philosopher Jacob Stegenga, Reader in History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Cambridge.</p><p class="">You can read the article that Stegenga wrote to accompany this episode, <a href="https://aeon.co/ideas/how-gentle-medicine-could-radically-transform-medical-practice">“Gentle medicine could radically transform medical practice”</a>, in <em>Aeon</em>.</p>
























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Medical Nihilism
          
          with Jacob Stegenga
        
        
          
            
            ]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <itunes:duration>1341</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
      <guid isPermaLink="false"><![CDATA[5ba53943c2ff61461b6956f4:5c35071f575d1f59c2a25537:5ed456d048814c0a3290e7fc]]></guid>
      <enclosure url="https://traffic.megaphone.fm/NBNK2002904901.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Miriam Solomon on Expert Consensus in Medicine</title>
      <link>https://jonathanfuller.ca/podcast/2020/5/3/miriam-solomon-expert-consensus-in-medicine</link>
      <description>In medicine, consensus statements abound. They’re issued by government agencies and professional societies as the official word on the science and practice of medicine. But what role does expert consensus serve? To summarize the evidence? To deliberate over decision-making? Or to command change? In an era of evidence-based medicine, is expert consensus going extinct? Or is it perhaps more important now than ever? Philosophers studying the social context of medical knowledge may have some answers.
Today’s consultation is with philosopher Miriam Solomon, Professor of Philosophy at Temple University.

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Expert consensus in medicine
          
          with Miriam Solomon</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2020 01:29:00 -0000</pubDate>
      <itunes:title>Expert consensus in medicine</itunes:title>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:author>Marshall Poe</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://megaphone.imgix.net/podcasts/c1f8fb80-9b71-11f1-ba53-2f0fe05fbcdc/image/6c43631ca1e9b359bd203b9b964f5822.png?ixlib=rails-4.3.1&amp;max-w=3000&amp;max-h=3000&amp;fit=crop&amp;auto=format,compress"/>
      <itunes:subtitle>with Miriam Solomon</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:summary>In medicine, consensus statements abound. They’re issued by government agencies and professional societies as the official word on the science and practice of medicine. But what role does expert consensus serve? To summarize the evidence? To deliberate over decision-making? Or to command change? In an era of evidence-based medicine, is expert consensus going extinct? Or is it perhaps more important now than ever? Philosophers studying the social context of medical knowledge may have some answers.
Today’s consultation is with philosopher Miriam Solomon, Professor of Philosophy at Temple University.

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Expert consensus in medicine
          
          with Miriam Solomon</itunes:summary>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p class="">  </p><p class="">In medicine, consensus statements abound. They’re issued by government agencies and professional societies as the official word on the science and practice of medicine. But what role does expert consensus serve? To summarize the evidence? To deliberate over decision-making? Or to command change? In an era of evidence-based medicine, is expert consensus going extinct? Or is it perhaps more important now than ever? Philosophers studying the social context of medical knowledge may have some answers.</p><p class="">Today’s consultation is with philosopher Miriam Solomon, Professor of Philosophy at Temple University.</p>
























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Expert consensus in medicine
          
          with Miriam Solomon
        
        
          
            
            ]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <itunes:duration>1362</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
      <guid isPermaLink="false"><![CDATA[5ba53943c2ff61461b6956f4:5c35071f575d1f59c2a25537:5eaf6e4c859ce170c6e1cb27]]></guid>
      <enclosure url="https://traffic.megaphone.fm/NBNK1666655274.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Causes of Disease with Alex Broadbent</title>
      <link>https://jonathanfuller.ca/podcast/2020/3/1/alex-broadbent-the-causes-of-disease</link>
      <description>The cause of tuberculosis is the germ Mycobacterium tuberculosis. Meanwhile, the causes of heart disease are variable: smoking, sedentary lifestyle, bad genes, and so on. Is this just a fact? Did the German microbiologist Robert Koch really discover that Mycobacterium tuberculosis is the cause of tuberculosis? According to some historians and philosophers, it’s more than just a matter of fact. It’s partly a conceptual choice of how we classify diseases, one with important implications for how epidemiology and medicine are practiced today. Thankfully, conceptual understanding and analysis is part of the scope of practice of a philosopher.
Today’s consultation is with philosopher Alex Broadbent, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Johannesburg.

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            The causes of disease
          
          with Alex Broadbent</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 02 Mar 2020 02:15:00 -0000</pubDate>
      <itunes:title>The causes of disease</itunes:title>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:author>Marshall Poe</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://megaphone.imgix.net/podcasts/b4908904-9b71-11f1-99ed-a310636820dc/image/6c43631ca1e9b359bd203b9b964f5822.png?ixlib=rails-4.3.1&amp;max-w=3000&amp;max-h=3000&amp;fit=crop&amp;auto=format,compress"/>
      <itunes:subtitle>with Alex Broadbent</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:summary>The cause of tuberculosis is the germ Mycobacterium tuberculosis. Meanwhile, the causes of heart disease are variable: smoking, sedentary lifestyle, bad genes, and so on. Is this just a fact? Did the German microbiologist Robert Koch really discover that Mycobacterium tuberculosis is the cause of tuberculosis? According to some historians and philosophers, it’s more than just a matter of fact. It’s partly a conceptual choice of how we classify diseases, one with important implications for how epidemiology and medicine are practiced today. Thankfully, conceptual understanding and analysis is part of the scope of practice of a philosopher.
Today’s consultation is with philosopher Alex Broadbent, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Johannesburg.

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            The causes of disease
          
          with Alex Broadbent</itunes:summary>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p class="">  </p><p class="">The cause of tuberculosis is the germ <em>Mycobacterium tuberculosis</em>. Meanwhile, the causes of heart disease are variable: smoking, sedentary lifestyle, bad genes, and so on. Is this just a fact? Did the German microbiologist Robert Koch really discover that <em>Mycobacterium tuberculosis</em> is <em>the</em> cause of tuberculosis? According to some historians and philosophers, it’s more than just a matter of fact. It’s partly a conceptual choice of how we classify diseases, one with important implications for how epidemiology and medicine are practiced today. Thankfully, conceptual understanding and analysis is part of the scope of practice of a philosopher.</p><p class="">Today’s consultation is with philosopher Alex Broadbent, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Johannesburg.</p>
























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            The causes of disease
          
          with Alex Broadbent
        
        
          
            
            ]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <itunes:duration>1422</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
      <guid isPermaLink="false"><![CDATA[5ba53943c2ff61461b6956f4:5c35071f575d1f59c2a25537:5e5c6b037a7f3216d6eebb9b]]></guid>
      <enclosure url="https://traffic.megaphone.fm/NBNK5012303238.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Evidence-based Medicine</title>
      <link>https://jonathanfuller.ca/podcast/2020/1/6/evidence-based-medicine</link>
      <description>Evidence-based medicine or EBM was introduced in the early 1990s as a move to increase medicine’s uptake of published scientific evidence, especially evidence from clinical epidemiology. It is now the standard, such that its underlying philosophical ideas have become invisible to many. However, since its launch, evidence-based medicine has had its critics, including healthcare professionals and philosophers. Philosophers began to ask questions: what is ‘evidence’ according to evidence-based medicine? What justifies EBM’s confidence in some forms of evidence – namely, randomized trials and meta-analyses – over others like observational studies or evidence of biologic mechanisms? Evidence-based medicine led to a renaissance in philosophical attention towards medicine and medical evidence.  
In today’s consultation, I speak with four philosophers of medicine: Ross Upshur, Jeremy Howick, Jacob Stegenga and John Worrall. Here’s my conversation with Ross Upshur, Professor in the Dalla Lana School of Public Heath at the University of Toronto.

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Evidence-based medicine</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 06 Jan 2020 15:05:00 -0000</pubDate>
      <itunes:title>Evidence-based medicine</itunes:title>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:author>Marshall Poe</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://megaphone.imgix.net/podcasts/a5de1368-9b71-11f1-9782-cfb4ea735425/image/6c43631ca1e9b359bd203b9b964f5822.png?ixlib=rails-4.3.1&amp;max-w=3000&amp;max-h=3000&amp;fit=crop&amp;auto=format,compress"/>
      <itunes:subtitle>Evidence-based medicine or EBM was introduced in the early 1990s as a move to increase medicine’s uptake of published scientific evidence, especially evidence from clinical epidemiology. It is now the standard, such that its underlying philosophical ideas have become invisible to many. However, since its launch, evidence-based medicine has had its critics, including healthcare professionals and philosophers. Philosophers began to ask questions: what is ‘evidence’ according to evidence-based medicine? What justifies EBM’s confidence in some forms of evidence – namely, randomized trials and meta-analyses – over others like observational studies or evidence of biologic mechanisms? Evidence-based medicine led to a renaissance in philosophical attention towards medicine and medical evidence.

In today’s consultation, I speak with four philosophers of medicine: Ross Upshur, Jeremy Howick, Jacob Stegenga and John Worrall. Here’s my conversation with Ross Upshur, Professor in the Dalla Lana School of Public Heath at the University of Toronto.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:summary>Evidence-based medicine or EBM was introduced in the early 1990s as a move to increase medicine’s uptake of published scientific evidence, especially evidence from clinical epidemiology. It is now the standard, such that its underlying philosophical ideas have become invisible to many. However, since its launch, evidence-based medicine has had its critics, including healthcare professionals and philosophers. Philosophers began to ask questions: what is ‘evidence’ according to evidence-based medicine? What justifies EBM’s confidence in some forms of evidence – namely, randomized trials and meta-analyses – over others like observational studies or evidence of biologic mechanisms? Evidence-based medicine led to a renaissance in philosophical attention towards medicine and medical evidence.  
In today’s consultation, I speak with four philosophers of medicine: Ross Upshur, Jeremy Howick, Jacob Stegenga and John Worrall. Here’s my conversation with Ross Upshur, Professor in the Dalla Lana School of Public Heath at the University of Toronto.

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Evidence-based medicine</itunes:summary>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p class="">  </p><p class="">Evidence-based medicine or EBM was introduced in the early 1990s as a move to increase medicine’s uptake of published scientific evidence, especially evidence from clinical epidemiology. It is now the standard, such that its underlying philosophical ideas have become invisible to many. However, since its launch, evidence-based medicine has had its critics, including healthcare professionals and philosophers. Philosophers began to ask questions: what is ‘evidence’ according to evidence-based medicine? What justifies EBM’s confidence in some forms of evidence – namely, randomized trials and meta-analyses – over others like observational studies or evidence of biologic mechanisms? Evidence-based medicine led to a renaissance in philosophical attention towards medicine and medical evidence.  </p><p class="">In today’s consultation, I speak with four philosophers of medicine: Ross Upshur, Jeremy Howick, Jacob Stegenga and John Worrall. Here’s my conversation with Ross Upshur, Professor in the Dalla Lana School of Public Heath at the University of Toronto.</p>
























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Evidence-based medicine
          
          
        
        
          
            
            ]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <itunes:duration>2406</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
      <guid isPermaLink="false"><![CDATA[5ba53943c2ff61461b6956f4:5c35071f575d1f59c2a25537:5e13437f42d66e7ee61336a1]]></guid>
      <enclosure url="https://traffic.megaphone.fm/NBNK6374269963.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Mental Disorders and the DSM</title>
      <link>https://jonathanfuller.ca/podcast/2019/11/11/mental-disorders-and-the-dsm</link>
      <description>Mental disorders cause suffering for many and pose challenges for the psychiatric profession. Throughout history, the way that society and psychiatry have thought about mental disorders has changed greatly. One area of great difficulty and great change has been psychiatric classification – how psychiatry carves up the realm of mental illness into diagnostic categories. During the second half of the Twentieth Century, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the DSM, became the bible of psychiatry, the most influential psychiatric classification system. But through its several editions, criticism has followed the DSM, which serves as a target for debates about how psychiatric diagnosis and research should be done. At the head of these debates have been several philosophers.
In today’s consultation, I speak with three philosophers of psychiatry: Rachel Cooper (Professor in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at Lancaster University), Jonathan Tsou (Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Iowa State University) and Kathryn Tabb (Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Bard College).

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Mental disorders and the DSM</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 12 Nov 2019 01:25:00 -0000</pubDate>
      <itunes:title>Mental disorders and the DSM</itunes:title>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:author>Marshall Poe</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://megaphone.imgix.net/podcasts/5f066b7a-9b71-11f1-99cb-37a351acb7f7/image/6c43631ca1e9b359bd203b9b964f5822.png?ixlib=rails-4.3.1&amp;max-w=3000&amp;max-h=3000&amp;fit=crop&amp;auto=format,compress"/>
      <itunes:subtitle>Mental disorders cause suffering for many and pose challenges for the psychiatric profession. Throughout history, the way that society and psychiatry have thought about mental disorders has changed greatly. One area of great difficulty and great change has been psychiatric classification – how psychiatry carves up the realm of mental illness into diagnostic categories. During the second half of the Twentieth Century, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the DSM, became the bible of psychiatry, the most influential psychiatric classification system. But through its several editions, criticism has followed the DSM, which serves as a target for debates about how psychiatric diagnosis and research should be done. At the head of these debates have been several philosophers.

In today’s consultation, I speak with three philosophers of psychiatry: Rachel Cooper (Professor in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at Lancaster University), Jonathan Tsou (Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Iowa State University) and Kathryn Tabb (Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Bard College). </itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:summary>Mental disorders cause suffering for many and pose challenges for the psychiatric profession. Throughout history, the way that society and psychiatry have thought about mental disorders has changed greatly. One area of great difficulty and great change has been psychiatric classification – how psychiatry carves up the realm of mental illness into diagnostic categories. During the second half of the Twentieth Century, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the DSM, became the bible of psychiatry, the most influential psychiatric classification system. But through its several editions, criticism has followed the DSM, which serves as a target for debates about how psychiatric diagnosis and research should be done. At the head of these debates have been several philosophers.
In today’s consultation, I speak with three philosophers of psychiatry: Rachel Cooper (Professor in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at Lancaster University), Jonathan Tsou (Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Iowa State University) and Kathryn Tabb (Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Bard College).

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Mental disorders and the DSM</itunes:summary>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p class="">Mental disorders cause suffering for many and pose challenges for the psychiatric profession. Throughout history, the way that society and psychiatry have thought about mental disorders has changed greatly. One area of great difficulty and great change has been psychiatric classification – how psychiatry carves up the realm of mental illness into diagnostic categories. During the second half of the Twentieth Century, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the DSM, became the bible of psychiatry, the most influential psychiatric classification system. But through its several editions, criticism has followed the DSM, which serves as a target for debates about how psychiatric diagnosis and research should be done. At the head of these debates have been several philosophers.</p><p class="">In today’s consultation, I speak with three philosophers of psychiatry: Rachel Cooper (Professor in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at Lancaster University), Jonathan Tsou (Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Iowa State University) and Kathryn Tabb (Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Bard College).</p>
























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Mental disorders and the DSM
          
          
        
        
          
            
            ]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <itunes:duration>2446</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
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      <enclosure url="https://traffic.megaphone.fm/NBNK3726801644.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A Primer on Health and Disease with Marc Ereshefsky</title>
      <link>https://jonathanfuller.ca/podcast/2019/10/6/marc-ereshefsky-primer-on-health-and-disease</link>
      <description>Health and disease are two concepts that dominate our lives. Analyzing these concepts has also dominated much of the discussion in the philosophy of medicine. Is health merely the absence of disease? Is disease a biological concept, a value-laden concept, or both? Why is it important that we dissect these concepts? Should we do away with them altogether, at least when it comes to the hard cases that generate controversy over who counts as healthy or diseased? In this episode, we provide a small primer on this big discussion.
Today’s consultation is with philosopher Marc Ereshefsky, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Calgary.

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Primer on health and disease
          
          with Marc Ereshefsky</description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 06 Oct 2019 14:18:00 -0000</pubDate>
      <itunes:title>Primer on health and disease</itunes:title>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:author>Marshall Poe</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://megaphone.imgix.net/podcasts/53b9f1c4-9b71-11f1-98b1-17b2f1cf3df8/image/6c43631ca1e9b359bd203b9b964f5822.png?ixlib=rails-4.3.1&amp;max-w=3000&amp;max-h=3000&amp;fit=crop&amp;auto=format,compress"/>
      <itunes:subtitle>with Marc Ereshefsky</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:summary>Health and disease are two concepts that dominate our lives. Analyzing these concepts has also dominated much of the discussion in the philosophy of medicine. Is health merely the absence of disease? Is disease a biological concept, a value-laden concept, or both? Why is it important that we dissect these concepts? Should we do away with them altogether, at least when it comes to the hard cases that generate controversy over who counts as healthy or diseased? In this episode, we provide a small primer on this big discussion.
Today’s consultation is with philosopher Marc Ereshefsky, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Calgary.

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Primer on health and disease
          
          with Marc Ereshefsky</itunes:summary>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p class="">Health and disease are two concepts that dominate our lives. Analyzing these concepts has also dominated much of the discussion in the philosophy of medicine. Is health merely the absence of disease? Is disease a biological concept, a value-laden concept, or both? Why is it important that we dissect these concepts? Should we do away with them altogether, at least when it comes to the hard cases that generate controversy over who counts as healthy or diseased? In this episode, we provide a small primer on this big discussion.</p><p class="">Today’s consultation is with philosopher Marc Ereshefsky, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Calgary.</p>
























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Primer on health and disease
          
          with Marc Ereshefsky
        
        
          
            
            ]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <itunes:duration>863</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
      <guid isPermaLink="false"><![CDATA[5ba53943c2ff61461b6956f4:5c35071f575d1f59c2a25537:5d99f5a05cbb7d7c85b1335d]]></guid>
      <enclosure url="https://traffic.megaphone.fm/NBNK6162347903.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Clinical Judgment</title>
      <link>https://jonathanfuller.ca/podcast/2019/9/2/clinical-judgment</link>
      <description>The mastery of clinical judgment is what separates the expert clinician from the novice. Yet clinical judgment remains somewhat obscure. Is it a tacit knowledge? Or one that can be formulated according to explicit rules? Is it a science? Or a virtue? Has it been replaced or its importance reduced by evidence-based medicine? Or will it soon be taken over from clinicians by intelligent machines? And what is clinical judgment, anyway? &amp;nbsp;
In today’s consultation, I sit down with four guests ahead of a clinical judgment symposium to see how they use philosophy to understand clinical judgment: Ross Upshur (University of Toronto), Luis Flores (King’s College London), Kathryn Montgomery (Northwestern University) and Benjamin Djulbegovic (University of South Florida).

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Clinical Judgment</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 02 Sep 2019 19:18:00 -0000</pubDate>
      <itunes:title>Clinical Judgment</itunes:title>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:author>Marshall Poe</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://megaphone.imgix.net/podcasts/3ecb78b4-9b71-11f1-94ec-37b6b580b514/image/6c43631ca1e9b359bd203b9b964f5822.png?ixlib=rails-4.3.1&amp;max-w=3000&amp;max-h=3000&amp;fit=crop&amp;auto=format,compress"/>
      <itunes:subtitle>The mastery of clinical judgment is what separates the expert clinician from the novice. Yet clinical judgment remains somewhat obscure. Is it a tacit knowledge? Or one that can be formulated according to explicit rules? Is it a science? Or a virtue? Has it been replaced or its importance reduced by evidence-based medicine? Or will it soon be taken over from clinicians by intelligent machines? And what is clinical judgment, anyway? 

In today's consultation, I sit down with four guests ahead of a clinical judgment symposium to see how they use philosophy to understand clinical judgment.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:summary>The mastery of clinical judgment is what separates the expert clinician from the novice. Yet clinical judgment remains somewhat obscure. Is it a tacit knowledge? Or one that can be formulated according to explicit rules? Is it a science? Or a virtue? Has it been replaced or its importance reduced by evidence-based medicine? Or will it soon be taken over from clinicians by intelligent machines? And what is clinical judgment, anyway? &amp;nbsp;
In today’s consultation, I sit down with four guests ahead of a clinical judgment symposium to see how they use philosophy to understand clinical judgment: Ross Upshur (University of Toronto), Luis Flores (King’s College London), Kathryn Montgomery (Northwestern University) and Benjamin Djulbegovic (University of South Florida).

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Clinical Judgment</itunes:summary>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p class="">The mastery of clinical judgment is what separates the expert clinician from the novice. Yet clinical judgment remains somewhat obscure. Is it a tacit knowledge? Or one that can be formulated according to explicit rules? Is it a science? Or a virtue? Has it been replaced or its importance reduced by evidence-based medicine? Or will it soon be taken over from clinicians by intelligent machines? And what is clinical judgment, anyway? &nbsp;</p><p class="">In today’s consultation, I sit down with four guests ahead of a clinical judgment symposium to see how they use philosophy to understand clinical judgment: Ross Upshur (University of Toronto), Luis Flores (King’s College London), Kathryn Montgomery (Northwestern University) and Benjamin Djulbegovic (University of South Florida).</p>
























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Clinical Judgment
          
          
        
        
          
            
            ]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <itunes:duration>1435</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
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      <enclosure url="https://traffic.megaphone.fm/NBNK8340522097.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Delusions with Matthew Parrott</title>
      <link>https://jonathanfuller.ca/podcast/2019/8/4/matthew-parrott-delusions</link>
      <description>Delusions are often defined as fixed false beliefs. They run contrary to common sense or counter-evidence that would convince any rational person, like the idea that aliens are communicating with me through a radio chip implanted in my brain, or the thought that my father has been replaced by an imposter, albeit an imposter that is identical to my father in every discernible way. But why do people acquire delusions in the first place? Philosophy is often thought to be a rational activity of the highest order. Maybe philosophers can shed some light on what is going wrong with the reasoning of people who have delusions?
Today’s consultation is with philosopher Matthew Parrott, Birmingham Fellow in Philosophy at the University of Birmingham (formerly at King’s College London).
This episode is published jointly with the Canadian Medical Association Journal. Visit the Journal website to read an accompanying article by Dr. Parrott, “Delusional possibilities” (2019, 191:&amp;nbsp;E867-E868).


























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Delusions
          
          with Matthew Parrott</description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 04 Aug 2019 15:56:00 -0000</pubDate>
      <itunes:title>Delusions</itunes:title>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:author>Marshall Poe</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://megaphone.imgix.net/podcasts/3113b01a-9b71-11f1-aade-bbb953f1bfc0/image/6c43631ca1e9b359bd203b9b964f5822.png?ixlib=rails-4.3.1&amp;max-w=3000&amp;max-h=3000&amp;fit=crop&amp;auto=format,compress"/>
      <itunes:subtitle>with Matthew Parrott</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:summary>Delusions are often defined as fixed false beliefs. They run contrary to common sense or counter-evidence that would convince any rational person, like the idea that aliens are communicating with me through a radio chip implanted in my brain, or the thought that my father has been replaced by an imposter, albeit an imposter that is identical to my father in every discernible way. But why do people acquire delusions in the first place? Philosophy is often thought to be a rational activity of the highest order. Maybe philosophers can shed some light on what is going wrong with the reasoning of people who have delusions?
Today’s consultation is with philosopher Matthew Parrott, Birmingham Fellow in Philosophy at the University of Birmingham (formerly at King’s College London).
This episode is published jointly with the Canadian Medical Association Journal. Visit the Journal website to read an accompanying article by Dr. Parrott, “Delusional possibilities” (2019, 191:&amp;nbsp;E867-E868).


























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Delusions
          
          with Matthew Parrott</itunes:summary>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p class="">Delusions are often defined as fixed false beliefs. They run contrary to common sense or counter-evidence that would convince any rational person, like the idea that aliens are communicating with me through a radio chip implanted in my brain, or the thought that my father has been replaced by an imposter, albeit an imposter that is identical to my father in every discernible way. But why do people acquire delusions in the first place? Philosophy is often thought to be a rational activity of the highest order. Maybe philosophers can shed some light on what is going wrong with the reasoning of people who have delusions?</p><p class="">Today’s consultation is with philosopher Matthew Parrott, Birmingham Fellow in Philosophy at the University of Birmingham (formerly at King’s College London).</p><p class="">This episode is published jointly with the <em>Canadian Medical Association Journal</em>. Visit the <em>Journal</em> website to read an accompanying article by Dr. Parrott, <a href="http://www.cmaj.ca/lookup/doi/10.1503/cmaj.190048">“Delusional possibilities”</a> (2019, 191:&nbsp;E867-E868).</p><p class=""></p>
























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Delusions
          
          with Matthew Parrott
        
        
          
            
            ]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <itunes:duration>1346</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
      <guid isPermaLink="false"><![CDATA[5ba53943c2ff61461b6956f4:5c35071f575d1f59c2a25537:5d46fbacd73cd50001221dad]]></guid>
      <enclosure url="https://traffic.megaphone.fm/NBNK7482697008.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Metaphysics of Pregnancy with Elselijn Kingma</title>
      <link>https://jonathanfuller.ca/podcast/2019/7/7/elselijn-kingma-metaphysics-of-pregnancy</link>
      <description>Often, when philosophical questions are asked about pregnancy, they concern ethical problems about abortion, surrogacy or assisted conception. But the answers to these questions might depend in part on answers to metaphysical questions. One of these metaphysical questions concerns the relationship between the mother and her fetus. Is the mother a biological container for her developing baby, or is the fetus a part of the mother? It’s a question that may have important implications, but it’s also one of the big existential questions of life, a question about what it is to be human.
Today’s consultation is with philosopher Elselijn Kingma, Associate Professor in Philosophy at the University of Southampton.

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Metaphysics of pregnancy
          
          with Elselijn Kingma</description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 07 Jul 2019 12:54:00 -0000</pubDate>
      <itunes:title>Metaphysics of pregnancy</itunes:title>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:author>Marshall Poe</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://megaphone.imgix.net/podcasts/359518ca-94cf-11f1-8fc1-0712709783df/image/6c43631ca1e9b359bd203b9b964f5822.png?ixlib=rails-4.3.1&amp;max-w=3000&amp;max-h=3000&amp;fit=crop&amp;auto=format,compress"/>
      <itunes:subtitle>with Elselijn Kingma</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:summary>Often, when philosophical questions are asked about pregnancy, they concern ethical problems about abortion, surrogacy or assisted conception. But the answers to these questions might depend in part on answers to metaphysical questions. One of these metaphysical questions concerns the relationship between the mother and her fetus. Is the mother a biological container for her developing baby, or is the fetus a part of the mother? It’s a question that may have important implications, but it’s also one of the big existential questions of life, a question about what it is to be human.
Today’s consultation is with philosopher Elselijn Kingma, Associate Professor in Philosophy at the University of Southampton.

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Metaphysics of pregnancy
          
          with Elselijn Kingma</itunes:summary>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p class="">Often, when philosophical questions are asked about pregnancy, they concern ethical problems about abortion, surrogacy or assisted conception. But the answers to these questions might depend in part on answers to metaphysical questions. One of these metaphysical questions concerns the relationship between the mother and her fetus. Is the mother a biological container for her developing baby, or is the fetus a part of the mother? It’s a question that may have important implications, but it’s also one of the big existential questions of life, a question about what it is to be human.</p><p class="">Today’s consultation is with philosopher Elselijn Kingma, Associate Professor in Philosophy at the University of Southampton.</p>
























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Metaphysics of pregnancy
          
          with Elselijn Kingma
        
        
          
            
            ]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <itunes:duration>1389</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
      <guid isPermaLink="false"><![CDATA[5ba53943c2ff61461b6956f4:5c35071f575d1f59c2a25537:5d21e960ce6c2600019cddb3]]></guid>
      <enclosure url="https://traffic.megaphone.fm/NBNK7943885648.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/>
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    <item>
      <title>Overdiagnosis and the Definition of Disease with Mary Walker</title>
      <link>https://jonathanfuller.ca/podcast/2019/6/2/mary-walker-overdiagnosis-and-the-definition-of-disease</link>
      <description>In recent years, physicians and health scientists have become increasingly concerned about overdiagnosis, the problem of diagnosing too many people as having a disease, be it breast or thyroid cancer, diabetes or pulmonary embolism. When considering who or what is at fault, the list of suspects often includes overly expansive screening programs, increasingly sensitive diagnostic tests, and unnecessary test-ordering. But should the list of the accused also include our definition of disease? And can philosophers studying disease concepts help to clear up our definition of disease – and even the problem of overdiagnosis itself?
Today’s consultation is with philosopher Mary Walker, Research Fellow in Philosophy at Monash University.

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Overdiagnosis and the definition of disease
          
          with Mary Walker</description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 02 Jun 2019 15:28:00 -0000</pubDate>
      <itunes:title>Overdiagnosis and the definition of disease</itunes:title>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:author>Marshall Poe</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://megaphone.imgix.net/podcasts/0eaa2cbe-94cf-11f1-8ea3-ff6ae085b03d/image/6c43631ca1e9b359bd203b9b964f5822.png?ixlib=rails-4.3.1&amp;max-w=3000&amp;max-h=3000&amp;fit=crop&amp;auto=format,compress"/>
      <itunes:subtitle>with Mary Walker</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:summary>In recent years, physicians and health scientists have become increasingly concerned about overdiagnosis, the problem of diagnosing too many people as having a disease, be it breast or thyroid cancer, diabetes or pulmonary embolism. When considering who or what is at fault, the list of suspects often includes overly expansive screening programs, increasingly sensitive diagnostic tests, and unnecessary test-ordering. But should the list of the accused also include our definition of disease? And can philosophers studying disease concepts help to clear up our definition of disease – and even the problem of overdiagnosis itself?
Today’s consultation is with philosopher Mary Walker, Research Fellow in Philosophy at Monash University.

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Overdiagnosis and the definition of disease
          
          with Mary Walker</itunes:summary>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p class="">In recent years, physicians and health scientists have become increasingly concerned about overdiagnosis, the problem of diagnosing too many people as having a disease, be it breast or thyroid cancer, diabetes or pulmonary embolism. When considering who or what is at fault, the list of suspects often includes overly expansive screening programs, increasingly sensitive diagnostic tests, and unnecessary test-ordering. But should the list of the accused also include our definition of disease? And can philosophers studying disease concepts help to clear up our definition of disease – and even the problem of overdiagnosis itself?</p><p class="">Today’s consultation is with philosopher Mary Walker, Research Fellow in Philosophy at Monash University.</p>
























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Overdiagnosis and the definition of disease
          
          with Mary Walker
        
        
          
            
            ]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <itunes:duration>1212</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
      <guid isPermaLink="false"><![CDATA[5ba53943c2ff61461b6956f4:5c35071f575d1f59c2a25537:5cf3e80ceba2fb0001547bdb]]></guid>
      <enclosure url="https://traffic.megaphone.fm/NBNK2677576134.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Are Diseases Real? with Jeremy Simon</title>
      <link>https://jonathanfuller.ca/podcast/2019/5/5/jeremy-simon-are-diseases-real</link>
      <description>I had a cold last winter, and so did countless other people. We had sore throats and runny noses and maybe even a cough. At first glance, it seems hard to deny that the common cold is real. But that’s exactly what a disease antirealist would deny, and there are some philosophical arguments to back them up. Not to be outdone, the disease realist has some philosophical arguments at their disposal too. But what does it mean ask whether diseases are real? And are diseases real or not?
Today’s consultation is with philosopher Jeremy Simon, Associate Professor at the Columbia University Medical Center.
This episode is published jointly with the Canadian Medical Association Journal. Visit the Journal website to read an accompanying article by Dr. Simon, “Conceptualizing diseases” (2019, 191:&amp;nbsp;E507-E508).

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Are diseases real?
          
          with guest Jeremy Simon</description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 05 May 2019 13:51:00 -0000</pubDate>
      <itunes:title>Are diseases real?</itunes:title>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:author>Marshall Poe</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://megaphone.imgix.net/podcasts/dbb4a1cc-91c7-11f1-ae39-1b3095b6e648/image/6c43631ca1e9b359bd203b9b964f5822.png?ixlib=rails-4.3.1&amp;max-w=3000&amp;max-h=3000&amp;fit=crop&amp;auto=format,compress"/>
      <itunes:subtitle>with guest Jeremy Simon</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:summary>I had a cold last winter, and so did countless other people. We had sore throats and runny noses and maybe even a cough. At first glance, it seems hard to deny that the common cold is real. But that’s exactly what a disease antirealist would deny, and there are some philosophical arguments to back them up. Not to be outdone, the disease realist has some philosophical arguments at their disposal too. But what does it mean ask whether diseases are real? And are diseases real or not?
Today’s consultation is with philosopher Jeremy Simon, Associate Professor at the Columbia University Medical Center.
This episode is published jointly with the Canadian Medical Association Journal. Visit the Journal website to read an accompanying article by Dr. Simon, “Conceptualizing diseases” (2019, 191:&amp;nbsp;E507-E508).

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Are diseases real?
          
          with guest Jeremy Simon</itunes:summary>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p class="">I had a cold last winter, and so did countless other people. We had sore throats and runny noses and maybe even a cough. At first glance, it seems hard to deny that the common cold is real. But that’s exactly what a disease antirealist would deny, and there are some philosophical arguments to back them up. Not to be outdone, the disease realist has some philosophical arguments at their disposal too. But what does it mean ask whether diseases are real? And are diseases real or not?</p><p class="">Today’s consultation is with philosopher Jeremy Simon, Associate Professor at the Columbia University Medical Center.</p><p class="">This episode is published jointly with the <em>Canadian Medical Association Journal</em>. Visit the <em>Journal</em> website to read an accompanying article by Dr. Simon, <a href="http://www.cmaj.ca/lookup/doi/10.1503/cmaj.181629">“Conceptualizing diseases”</a> (2019, 191:&nbsp;E507-E508).</p>
























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Are diseases real?
          
          with guest Jeremy Simon
        
        
          
            
            ]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <itunes:duration>1422</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
      <guid isPermaLink="false"><![CDATA[5ba53943c2ff61461b6956f4:5c35071f575d1f59c2a25537:5ccee650c83025561ce3619c]]></guid>
      <enclosure url="https://traffic.megaphone.fm/NBNK3438121789.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Vaccine Hesitancy and Public Trust in Healthcare with Maya Goldenberg</title>
      <link>https://jonathanfuller.ca/podcast/2019/4/6/maya-goldenberg-vaccine-hesitancy-and-public-trust-in-healthcare</link>
      <description>Vaccine hesitancy is a cautious or critical stance towards vaccines. By some estimates, it is on the rise among the public. Medicine and public health have responded to this state of affairs partly by communicating the evidence on vaccines to the public. But some believe that this approach ignores important aspects of the nature of medical evidence, the values of the public and public health, and the conditions needed to foster trust in our healthcare institutions. These are the kinds of topics with which philosophers interested in the social dimensions of medicine and medical science grapple. 
Today’s consultation is with philosopher Maya Goldenberg, Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Guelph.
This episode is published jointly with the Canadian Medical Association Journal. Visit the Journal website to read an accompanying article by Dr. Goldenberg, “Vaccines, values and science” (2019, 191:&amp;nbsp;E397-E398).  

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Vaccine hesitancy and public trust in healthcare
          
          with guest Maya Goldenberg</description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 06 Apr 2019 13:53:00 -0000</pubDate>
      <itunes:title>Vaccine hesitancy and public trust in healthcare</itunes:title>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:author>Marshall Poe</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://megaphone.imgix.net/podcasts/dc068bb8-91c7-11f1-ae39-bf687bebe4da/image/6c43631ca1e9b359bd203b9b964f5822.png?ixlib=rails-4.3.1&amp;max-w=3000&amp;max-h=3000&amp;fit=crop&amp;auto=format,compress"/>
      <itunes:subtitle>with guest Maya Goldenberg</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:summary>Vaccine hesitancy is a cautious or critical stance towards vaccines. By some estimates, it is on the rise among the public. Medicine and public health have responded to this state of affairs partly by communicating the evidence on vaccines to the public. But some believe that this approach ignores important aspects of the nature of medical evidence, the values of the public and public health, and the conditions needed to foster trust in our healthcare institutions. These are the kinds of topics with which philosophers interested in the social dimensions of medicine and medical science grapple. 
Today’s consultation is with philosopher Maya Goldenberg, Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Guelph.
This episode is published jointly with the Canadian Medical Association Journal. Visit the Journal website to read an accompanying article by Dr. Goldenberg, “Vaccines, values and science” (2019, 191:&amp;nbsp;E397-E398).  

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Vaccine hesitancy and public trust in healthcare
          
          with guest Maya Goldenberg</itunes:summary>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p>Vaccine hesitancy is a cautious or critical stance towards vaccines. By some estimates, it is on the rise among the public. Medicine and public health have responded to this state of affairs partly by communicating the evidence on vaccines to the public. But some believe that this approach ignores important aspects of the nature of medical evidence, the values of the public and public health, and the conditions needed to foster trust in our healthcare institutions. These are the kinds of topics with which philosophers interested in the social dimensions of medicine and medical science grapple. </p><p>Today’s consultation is with philosopher Maya Goldenberg, Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Guelph.</p><p>This episode is published jointly with the <em>Canadian Medical Association Journal</em>. Visit the <em>Journal</em> website to read an accompanying article by Dr. Goldenberg, <a href="http://www.cmaj.ca/content/191/14/E397">“Vaccines, values and science”</a> (2019, 191:&nbsp;E397-E398).  </p>
























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Vaccine hesitancy and public trust in healthcare
          
          with guest Maya Goldenberg
        
        
          
            
            ]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <itunes:duration>1133</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
      <guid isPermaLink="false"><![CDATA[5ba53943c2ff61461b6956f4:5c35071f575d1f59c2a25537:5ca8a9faeef1a19e525517e3]]></guid>
      <enclosure url="https://traffic.megaphone.fm/NBNK1354924935.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/>
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    <item>
      <title>Pick Your Medicine: Evidence-based, Narrative, or Precision? with Miriam Solomon</title>
      <link>https://jonathanfuller.ca/podcast/2019/2/23/pick-your-medicine-evidence-based-narrative-or-precision</link>
      <description>Evidence-based medicine. Narrative medicine. Precision medicine. Are these the names of new schools of medicine? Or of new models for medical research or practice? Or are they simply a clever (and in some cases, lucrative) rebranding of older ideas? What do they have to offer medicine? What’s all the fuss about? In part, these recent and influential movements in medicine concern medical knowledge and medical evidence, so what might philosophers studying medical knowledge and evidence have to say about these three ‘medicines’?

Today’s consultation is with philosopher Miriam Solomon, Professor of Philosophy at Temple University.

This episode is published jointly with the Canadian Medical Association Journal. Visit the Journal website to read an accompanying article by Prof. Solomon, “On ways of knowing in medicine” (2016,&amp;nbsp;188&amp;nbsp;(4):&amp;nbsp;289-290).


























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
          
            Pick your medicine: evidence-based, narrative, or precision?
          
          with guest Miriam Solomon</description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2019 15:54:00 -0000</pubDate>
      <itunes:title>Pick your medicine: evidence-based, narrative or precision?</itunes:title>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:author>Marshall Poe</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://megaphone.imgix.net/podcasts/dc4f415a-91c7-11f1-842d-b3a5816c0338/image/6c43631ca1e9b359bd203b9b964f5822.png?ixlib=rails-4.3.1&amp;max-w=3000&amp;max-h=3000&amp;fit=crop&amp;auto=format,compress"/>
      <itunes:subtitle>with guest Miriam Solomon</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:summary>Evidence-based medicine. Narrative medicine. Precision medicine. Are these the names of new schools of medicine? Or of new models for medical research or practice? Or are they simply a clever (and in some cases, lucrative) rebranding of older ideas? What do they have to offer medicine? What’s all the fuss about? In part, these recent and influential movements in medicine concern medical knowledge and medical evidence, so what might philosophers studying medical knowledge and evidence have to say about these three ‘medicines’?

Today’s consultation is with philosopher Miriam Solomon, Professor of Philosophy at Temple University.

This episode is published jointly with the Canadian Medical Association Journal. Visit the Journal website to read an accompanying article by Prof. Solomon, “On ways of knowing in medicine” (2016,&amp;nbsp;188&amp;nbsp;(4):&amp;nbsp;289-290).


























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
          
            Pick your medicine: evidence-based, narrative, or precision?
          
          with guest Miriam Solomon</itunes:summary>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p>Evidence-based medicine. Narrative medicine. Precision medicine. Are these the names of new schools of medicine? Or of new models for medical research or practice? Or are they simply a clever (and in some cases, lucrative) rebranding of older ideas? What do they have to offer medicine? What’s all the fuss about? In part, these recent and influential movements in medicine concern medical knowledge and medical evidence, so what might philosophers studying medical knowledge and evidence have to say about these three ‘medicines’?</p>
<p>Today’s consultation is with philosopher Miriam Solomon, Professor of Philosophy at Temple University.</p>
<p>This episode is published jointly with the <em>Canadian Medical Association Journal</em>. Visit the <em>Journal</em> website to read an accompanying article by Prof. Solomon, <a href="http://www.cmaj.ca/content/188/4/289/tab-article-info">“On ways of knowing in medicine”</a> (2016,&nbsp;188&nbsp;(4):&nbsp;289-290).</p>
<p>
























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
          
            Pick your medicine: evidence-based, narrative, or precision?
          
          with guest Miriam Solomon</p>]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <itunes:duration>1340</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
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    </item>
    <item>
      <title>What is Medicine? with Alex Broadbent</title>
      <link>https://jonathanfuller.ca/podcast/2019/1/26/alex-broadbent-what-is-medicine</link>
      <description>What is medicine? That question certainly has the ring of a paradigmatic philosophical problem. Yet surprisingly few contemporary philosophers have devoted sustained attention to it. Nonetheless, potentially underlying the question ‘what is medicine?’ are problems concerning the goals of medicine, about medical expertise, and about what counts as health and what counts as disease, problems that determine the very scope of medicine and medical practice. So perhaps it’s time to get paradigmatically philosophical about medicine.
Today’s consultation is with philosopher Alex Broadbent, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Johannesburg.
This episode is published jointly with the Canadian Medical Association Journal. Visit the Journal website to read an accompanying article by Prof. Broadbent, “The inquiry model of medicine” (2019, 191:&amp;nbsp;E105-E106).

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            What is medicine?
          
          with guest Alex Broadbent</description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 27 Jan 2019 01:50:00 -0000</pubDate>
      <itunes:title>What is medicine?</itunes:title>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:author>Marshall Poe</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://megaphone.imgix.net/podcasts/dc9fe54c-91c7-11f1-842d-57601acc6f06/image/6c43631ca1e9b359bd203b9b964f5822.png?ixlib=rails-4.3.1&amp;max-w=3000&amp;max-h=3000&amp;fit=crop&amp;auto=format,compress"/>
      <itunes:subtitle>with guest Alex Broadbent</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:summary>What is medicine? That question certainly has the ring of a paradigmatic philosophical problem. Yet surprisingly few contemporary philosophers have devoted sustained attention to it. Nonetheless, potentially underlying the question ‘what is medicine?’ are problems concerning the goals of medicine, about medical expertise, and about what counts as health and what counts as disease, problems that determine the very scope of medicine and medical practice. So perhaps it’s time to get paradigmatically philosophical about medicine.
Today’s consultation is with philosopher Alex Broadbent, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Johannesburg.
This episode is published jointly with the Canadian Medical Association Journal. Visit the Journal website to read an accompanying article by Prof. Broadbent, “The inquiry model of medicine” (2019, 191:&amp;nbsp;E105-E106).

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            What is medicine?
          
          with guest Alex Broadbent</itunes:summary>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p>What is medicine? That question certainly has the ring of a paradigmatic philosophical problem. Yet surprisingly few contemporary philosophers have devoted sustained attention to it. Nonetheless, potentially underlying the question ‘what is medicine?’ are problems concerning the goals of medicine, about medical expertise, and about what counts as health and what counts as disease, problems that determine the very scope of medicine and medical practice. So perhaps it’s time to get paradigmatically philosophical about medicine.</p><p>Today’s consultation is with philosopher Alex Broadbent, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Johannesburg.</p><p>This episode is published jointly with the <em>Canadian Medical Association Journal</em>. Visit the <em>Journal</em> website to read an accompanying article by Prof. Broadbent, <a href="http://www.cmaj.ca/content/191/4/E105">“The inquiry model of medicine”</a> (2019, 191:&nbsp;E105-E106).</p>
























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            What is medicine?
          
          with guest Alex Broadbent
        
        
          
            
            ]]>
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      <itunes:duration>1303</itunes:duration>
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      <title>Philosophers on Medicine: A New Frontier with Dorian Deshauer</title>
      <link>https://jonathanfuller.ca/podcast/2019/1/26/philosophers-on-medicine-a-new-frontier</link>
      <description>The Best Physician is also a Philosopher. This is the title of a book by Galen, the famous physician of Antiquity. Was Galen right? Or is it that for many problems in healthcare, philosophy is the best medicine? One thing is for certain: medicine is a new frontier for philosophy, and philosophy for medicine. 
In this episode, I’ve enlisted Dorian Deshauer, psychiatrist at the University of Toronto and Associate Editor of the Canadian Medical Association Journal, to help me speak more about the philosophy of medicine.

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Philosophers on Medicine - A New Frontier
          
          Jonathan Fuller</description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 27 Jan 2019 01:50:00 -0000</pubDate>
      <itunes:title>Philosophers on Medicine - A New Frontier</itunes:title>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:author>Marshall Poe</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://megaphone.imgix.net/podcasts/dcf3ca40-91c7-11f1-842d-a7b9027e6199/image/9e818cf738eb3f5413c5f82b9ff7dd5b.png?ixlib=rails-4.3.1&amp;max-w=3000&amp;max-h=3000&amp;fit=crop&amp;auto=format,compress"/>
      <itunes:subtitle>with guest host Dorian Deshauer</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:summary>The Best Physician is also a Philosopher. This is the title of a book by Galen, the famous physician of Antiquity. Was Galen right? Or is it that for many problems in healthcare, philosophy is the best medicine? One thing is for certain: medicine is a new frontier for philosophy, and philosophy for medicine. 
In this episode, I’ve enlisted Dorian Deshauer, psychiatrist at the University of Toronto and Associate Editor of the Canadian Medical Association Journal, to help me speak more about the philosophy of medicine.

























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Philosophers on Medicine - A New Frontier
          
          Jonathan Fuller</itunes:summary>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p>The <em>Best Physician is also a Philosopher</em>. This is the title of a book by Galen, the famous physician of Antiquity. Was Galen right? Or is it that for many problems in healthcare, philosophy is the best medicine? One thing is for certain: medicine is a new frontier for philosophy, and philosophy for medicine. </p><p>In this episode, I’ve enlisted Dorian Deshauer, psychiatrist at the University of Toronto and Associate Editor of the <em>Canadian Medical Association Journal</em>, to help me speak more about the philosophy of medicine.</p>
























  


  
  
  
    
      
        
          
            
          
          
            
          
        
        
          
        
        
          
            Philosophers on Medicine - A New Frontier
          
          Jonathan Fuller
        
        
          
            
            ]]>
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      <itunes:duration>1194</itunes:duration>
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